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A CASE AGAINST COLLABORATION 
RACHEL REBOUCHÉ* 
 In family law, as in other legal disciplines, the use of alternative 
dispute resolution has dramatically increased.  In a process called 
collaborative divorce, separating spouses hire attorneys who 
agree to work together—almost entirely outside of the court sys-
tem—to reach a settlement ending the marriage.  A team of experts, 
including mental health professionals, financial neutrals, and par-
enting coordinators, helps the parties resolve conflicts and settle 
property, support, and custody disputes.  For divorcing couples, 
the collaborative process promises emotional healing and avoid-
ance of contentious litigation.  Advocates for collaborative divorce 
describe the transformational effects of the process in an evangel-
ical tone. 
 But collaborative divorce has costs.  Collaboration can include 
considerations of marital fault that feminists helped eliminate from 
divorce laws.  By focusing on conflict resolution, even for the pur-
pose of building post-divorce relationships, collaborative negotia-
tions introduce judgments of “good” and “bad” marital conduct, 
potentially reinforcing stereotyped gender roles, such as the 
blameless wife and the guilty husband.  These heteronormative 
paradigms are out of date: gender roles have evolved, the popula-
tion of married people has changed, and marriage rights have ex-
tended to couples of the same sex. 
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 Collaborative processes also have distributive consequences.  
Collaboration privileges wealthy parties who may understate their 
bargaining power.  At the same time, collaboration may not reach 
vulnerable spouses who could benefit from therapeutic interven-
tions.  Collaborative divorce can be blind to situational power and 
structural inequality. 
 The purpose of these critiques is not to undermine therapeutic 
approaches or to argue that law should ignore spousal miscon-
duct.  Rather, this Article suggests that advocates for collaborative 
divorce—including some feminist scholars who have theorized the 
shortcomings of no-fault divorce laws—might understand better 
how parties negotiate, and what they may sacrifice, within a col-
laborative framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Divorce can be expensive and emotionally difficult.1  Films, books, self-
help manuals, and almost anything that describes the dissolution of marriage 
lament that the traditional approach to divorce is not only a painful process, 
                                                          
 1.  For example, the 2014 documentary, Divorce Corp., made headlines with its jarring exposé 
of the costs of getting divorced and the problems with the nation’s divorce process.  DIVORCE CORP. 
(Candor Entertainment 2014); see also Robert Pagliarini, Divorce Corp Documentary: How To 
Make Divorce Better, FORBES (May 14, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rob-
ertpagliarini/2014/05/14/divorce-corp-documentary-how-to-make-divorce-better; Nicholas 
Rapold, Splitsville, a Land of Diabolical Lawyers: “Divorce Corp.,” a Documentary by Joseph 
Sorge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/movies/divorce-corp-a-
documentary-by-joseph-sorge.html. 
 2017] A CASE AGAINST COLLABORATION 549 
 
but also a broken one.2  Family courts are overstretched, and legal profes-
sionals who represent divorcing individuals are overworked, charge expen-
sive fees, and often are accused of insensitivity to their clients’ needs.3  Re-
sponsive to some of these problems, alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
mechanisms, such as mediation and arbitration, have proliferated in state 
family law systems, moving away from court-managed processes and toward 
client-centered, private dispute resolution.4 
Although collaborative divorce is part of a trend toward ADR in family 
law, collaborative divorce is distinct from mediation and arbitration in sev-
eral ways.5  Separating spouses in a collaborative divorce hire attorneys who 
agree to work together, before parties file a divorce petition and without court 
assistance, to reach a settlement agreement.  A team of non-legal profession-
als—mental health experts (or divorce coaches), accountants acting as finan-
cial neutrals, and parenting coordinators—assists the parties in resolving 
property, support, and custody issues.  Because disclosure of financial infor-
mation is entirely voluntary, the lawyers and other professionals agree to 
withdraw from representation if either party threatens litigation or negotiates 
in bad faith.6  The collaborative process concludes with the filing of a joint 
divorce petition and settlement agreement. 
                                                          
 2.  See generally WENDY PARIS, SPLITOPIA: DISPATCHES FROM TODAY’S GOOD DIVORCE 
AND HOW TO PART WELL 145–65 (2016) (describing the emotional and psychological costs of di-
vorce, as well has how to respond in a proactive manner); SUZANNE RISS & JILL SOCKWELL, THE 
OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO DIVORCE: HOW TO GET THROUGH YOUR BREAKUP AND CREATE A NEW 
LIFE YOU LOVE (2016).  One of the best-known advice books on divorce is CONSTANCE AHRONS, 
THE GOOD DIVORCE: KEEPING YOUR FAMILY TOGETHER WHEN YOUR MARRIAGE COMES APART 
(1994).  Handbooks and websites on navigating the conflicts and costs of divorce are too numerous 
to list here.  See, e.g., Susanna Schrobsdorff, The Rise of the ‘Good Divorce’, TIME (July 3, 2015), 
http://time.com/3969264/the-rise-of-the-good-divorce. 
 3.  See generally Gerald Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court 
Judge’s Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57 (2005); Timothy Casey, When Good In-
tentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU 
L. REV. 1459 (2004). 
 4.  For discussion of the trend toward ADR in family law, see generally JANE C. MURPHY & 
JANA B. SINGER, DIVORCED FROM REALITY: RETHINKING FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2015); 
RESOLVING FAMILY CONFLICTS (Jana B. Singer & Jane C. Murphy eds., 2008); Jana B. Singer, The 
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443.  For a scholarly critique of ADR in various 
legal disciplines, see Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, 
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015). 
 5.  See, e.g., KATHERINE E. STONER, DIVORCE WITHOUT COURT: A GUIDE TO MEDIATION & 
COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE (2d ed. 2009). 
 6.  See infra Part I.A.1 (describing the collaborative divorce process); see also STUART G. 
WEBB & RONALD D. OUSKY, THE COLLABORATIVE WAY TO DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY 
METHOD THAT RESULTS IN LESS STRESS, LOWER COSTS, AND HAPPIER KIDS—WITHOUT GOING 
TO COURT 191 app. A, at 197 (2006) (including a sample participation agreement with a provision 
requiring attorney withdrawal in the event either party “has taken unfair advantage of [the] pro-
cess”).  
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Buoyed by advocacy and marketing, collaborative divorce is reshaping 
divorce practices across the country.7  Yet, academic commentary about col-
laborative divorce is surprisingly thin.  Scholars have questioned whether the 
withdrawal provisions or the team approach violate professional ethics and, 
to date, most legal scholarship has focused on the intersection of collabora-
tive divorce with professional responsibilities.8  Many of these concerns have 
been resolved by state laws and have been addressed by the model Uniform 
Collaborative Law Act.9  Statutes in several jurisdictions explicitly authorize 
collaborative teams to work with divorcing couples in compliance with pro-
fessional responsibility rules.10 
In contrast to that literature, most writings on the substance or outcomes 
of collaboration support its advancement and extol its transformational prom-
ise.  For many, collaborative divorce embodies a uniquely client-centered ap-
proach.11  Participants in a collaborative divorce are encouraged to “put law 
to the side” and find creative solutions, tailored to their problems.12  Advo-
cates for collaboration argue that clients’ control of settlement negotiations 
eliminates uncertainty about how courts will apply indeterminate alimony 
and custody laws.13  In this way, collaborative divorce is a potential response 
to the critiques of indeterminism: for instance, some courts have applied 
broad alimony and custody standards in ways that undervalue domestic con-
tributions or make invisible caretaking work.  Collaborative divorce also al-
lows parties to contract around what courts might otherwise order.  Private 
negotiations address some scholars’ concerns about the erasure of fault.  Col-
laborating couples can discuss marital misconduct that would be irrelevant to 
                                                          
 7.  See Geoff Williams, Why a Collaborative Divorce Makes Financial Sense, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 19, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/arti-
cles/2013/08/19/why-a-collaborative-divorce-makes-financial-sense.  See generally PAULINE H. 
TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO 
RESTRUCTURE YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE 258 app. 
B (2006) (providing a sample participation agreement, which illustrates differences between collab-
orative divorce and traditional divorce litigation).  
 8.  See, e.g., infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (summarizing the existing literature on 
collaboration and professional ethics). 
 9.  Andrew Schepard & David A. Hoffman, Regulating Collaborative Law: The Uniform Col-
laborative Law Act Takes Shape, 17 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 26, 28–29 (2010). 
 10.  See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Collaborative divorce draws from the field of therapeutic jurisprudence because it seeks to 
introduce concerns about clients’ mental and emotional wellbeing into legal processes.  Bruce Win-
nick describes therapeutic jurisprudence as an interdisciplinary approach, incorporating an assess-
ment “of law’s impact on health and mental health.”  Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 645, 647–52 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996). 
 12.  See infra Part I.B (describing the client-centered, therapeutic approach of collaborative di-
vorce).  
 13.  See infra Part II.B (describing contemporary objections to custody and alimony rules).   
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establishing a no-fault ground or typically immaterial to spousal support or 
property rights.14   
A goal of collaboration is to reduce acrimony between parties by ad-
dressing the damage caused by the marital split, focusing on the parties’—
and their children’s—emotional wellbeing.15  The process is thus future-ori-
ented; the examination of marital miscommunication or misbehavior is for 
the purpose of building a foundation for a healthy post-divorce relationship 
and protecting children from the fallout of separation.  Meeting those objec-
tives, however, often requires accounting for the past.  Collaboration encour-
ages divorcing couples to express anger and to seek forgiveness for harms 
caused in marriage, and it promises to provide parties with tools for managing 
disagreements and reducing conflict.16  For these purposes, marketing for col-
laborative divorce targets spouses who will share parenting responsibilities 
or otherwise have continuing roles in each other’s lives.  Yet, generally, pro-
ponents view collaborative divorce as appropriate for almost anyone, except 
spouses in abusive relationships.17   
Supporters use an almost evangelical tone to describe collaborative di-
vorce’s benefits for clients and lawyers.  Collaboration’s orientation toward 
providing a humane process and reparative outcomes is a significant and im-
portant intervention in divorce reform.  But this Article suggests that intro-
ducing parties’ marital misconduct and focusing on their post-divorce rela-
tionship may undercut some of the advantages of no-fault divorce.  
Collaborative approaches to improving communication and promoting for-
giveness may entrench stereotypes that were common in the fault era.  Col-
laborative materials tend to rely on patterned narratives about how and why 
                                                          
 14.  See infra Parts II.A–B (describing the transition to no-fault divorce).  In no-fault proceed-
ings, marital misconduct does not establish a ground for divorce as it did under a fault regime; in 
most states, fault is irrelevant to alimony determinations.  For both a history of alimony to compen-
sate the wronged spouse under a fault regime and a contestation of parts of that history, see June 
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925, 928–36 (2015). 
 15.  For summaries of the therapeutic aspects of collaborative divorce, see generally KATE 
SCHARFF & LISA HERRICK, NAVIGATING EMOTIONAL CURRENTS IN COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: 
A GUIDE TO ENLIGHTENED TEAM PRACTICE (2010), Susan J. Gamache, Family Peacemaking with 
an Interdisciplinary Team: A Therapist’s Perspective, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 378 (2015), and Marina 
Tolou-Shams, Collaborative Divorce: An Oxymoron?, 31 BROWN U. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
BEHAV. LETTER 1,  4–6 (2015).   
 16.  See PA. BAR INST., EVOLUTION, ENHANCEMENT, AND ENRICHMENT IN FAMILY COURT 
2011, 136, 137 (2011) (demonstrating that participation agreements require that clients pledge to 
“resolve or minimize the negative emotional and behavioral dynamics that contribute to conflict,” 
and to make compromises that “meet the fundamental needs” of the other party); WEBB & OUSKY 
supra note 6, at 217 (listing objectives of collaborative divorce, including emotional stability and 
making amends to the other party).  Amy Cohen persuasively argued that modern ADR responded 
to earlier critiques that family law negotiations minimized and excluded parties’ emotions like an-
ger.  Amy J. Cohen, The Family, The Market, and ADR, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 91, 118–22 (2011). 
 17.  See infra note 105 (summarizing authors who believe relationships marked by domestic 
violence make couples poor candidates for collaborative divorce).  
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marriages end, loosely analogous to the stock explanations of marital failure 
that pervaded the fault regime.  Examples in collaborative handbooks, guides, 
and manuals—which are designed to instruct professionals on how to con-
duct a collaborative divorce and to entice clients to participate in a collabo-
rative process—portray bad-behaving men and duped women.  And, case 
studies rarely involve couples of the same sex.18  Collaborative materials tend 
to rely on stereotypes about feminine and masculine behavior: women are 
caretakers concerned mostly about children’s well-being during divorce, and 
men are breadwinners concerned mostly about protecting their assets and fu-
ture earning potential.19  Collaboration has the potential to reduce marriage 
to gendered, heteronormative roles that may sustain rather than subvert gen-
der stereotypes.20  Even if these stereotypes reflect some realities, collabora-
tive divorce’s malleability and client-centered approach can accommodate all 
manner of relationships and lifestyles.  
These characterizations of spousal roles and priorities may have conse-
quences for settlement agreements.  Collaborative negotiations could disfa-
vor women who engage in marital misconduct or who do not conform to the 
conventional expectations of wives or mothers.  It may also understate some 
women’s bargaining power, who are not financially vulnerable or disadvan-
taged compared to their spouses.  Further, emphasizing post-divorce relation-
ships will also shape parties’ negotiations.  The collaborative process might 
exert pressure on the spouse with less wealth to agree to have a post-divorce 
relationship in order to receive financial support.21  It can also induce a spouse 
to provide spousal support in exchange for forgiveness or friendship when 
                                                          
 18.  See infra Part III.A.  The scarcity of examples that involve couples of the same sex in 
collaborative materials is not necessarily surprising given the contemporary nature of same-sex 
marriage rights.  That said, several states have extended marriage rights to same-sex couples for 
over a decade, and, as Part III.A contemplates, the omission of same-sex couples from collaborative 
materials will become all the more significant after the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
 19.  See infra Part III.B (citing contemporary collaborative divorce training materials). 
 20.  Amy Cohen, Gender: An (Un)Useful Category of Prescriptive Negotiation Analysis?, 13 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 169, 171, 173 (2003).  
 21.  See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1545, 1550 (1991).  In Trina Grillo’s iconic article on mediation’s downsides for women, she 
stated: “If two parties are forced to engage with one another, and one has a more relational sense of 
self than the other, that party may feel compelled to maintain her connection with the other, even to 
her own detriment.  For this reason, the party with the more relational sense of self will be at a 
disadvantage in a mediated negotiation.”  Id.  For a feminist critique of out-of-court measures, see 
generally id. at 1601–07, Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage 
Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 33–34 (1995), and Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom 
Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
339, 374–76 (1999). 
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the application of statutory factors (or a state formula) might result in a lim-
ited alimony award, or none at all.22 
It is difficult to evaluate whether collaboration results in empathy and 
stability or conflict and disappointment—indeed, the private aspects of col-
laboration make its “success” challenging to assess.  Good faith financial dis-
closure can invite incomplete information and abuse that are hard to measure.  
Ex-spouses may end up in court after collaboration over modifications to the 
settlement agreement and custody arrangements.  Commitments to conflict 
resolution and emotional healing during collaborative negotiations may ob-
scure the likelihood of these future disagreements.23 
The purpose of this Article is not to discredit collaborative divorce; ra-
ther, it is to examine what role collaboration plays in sustaining gendered 
ideas of spousal behavior in marriage and in settlement negotiations.  Part I 
describes how collaboration works, the agreement parties are required to 
sign, and the purported benefits for clients and their lawyers.  Part II describes 
the historical backdrop against which collaborative divorce emerged, includ-
ing the introduction of no-fault laws and reform of alimony and custody rules.  
Part III shows how collaborative divorce builds on feminist and family law 
scholarship that calls for consideration of marital misconduct in settlement 
negotiations and in divorce proceedings.  The Article concludes by arguing 
that collaborative processes can both benefit and disadvantage women; even 
when wives receive all they want from collaborative negotiations, it is often 
at the expense of perpetuating stereotypes about women’s negotiation power 
within families and at divorce. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND OPERATION OF COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE 
Collaborative divorce reflects longstanding efforts to reform family law 
courts through ADR,24 and ADR mechanisms recognize a “therapeutically 
                                                          
 22.  See Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Par-
adigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 367 (2009) (critiquing “therapeutic, holistic, and interdiscipli-
nary interventions” as detracting from the court’s “role as a forum for fair and authoritative dispute 
resolution”). 
 23.  Many collaborative agreements include provisions that pledge to return to a collaborative 
process if one party desires to modify the agreement or if the parties disagree about enforcement of 
the settlement’s terms.  See, e.g., PA. BAR INST., supra note 16.  However, if divorced parties refuse 
to collaborate, it is difficult to know how such a provision would be enforced. 
 24.  In the early 1900s, progressive reformers sought to stabilize families through a juvenile 
court system.  Reformers considered dependency and delinquency courts to be a better alternative 
to adversarial, civil processes, because these new courts could help “rescue” children from bad fam-
ilies and rehabilitate struggling parents.  Social workers, probation officers, and other state actors 
were part of the courts’ design, and by 1925, almost every state had some type of juvenile court.  
MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 14.  However, concern over the coercive sanctions judges 
handed down dampened enthusiasm for the approach used by these courts.  See generally Catherine 
J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. 
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enhanced, ecological human development model as a means of promoting 
problem solving.”25  Therapeutic and ecological approaches to legal services 
promote positive emotional and psychological outcomes.  These types of ser-
vices typically rely on experts, such as caseworkers or psychologists, to assist 
judges and lawyers.26  This Part explains how the defining features of collab-
orative divorce draw from these influences and incorporate therapeutic goals 
through a team-led participation agreement.27  It also examines the increasing 
number of attorneys who proclaim the therapeutic rewards of the collabora-
tive process. 
A.  The Collaborative Process 
Most collaborative materials begin with the well-known premise that 
divorce litigation and the conflict it entails are costly, time consuming, and, 
most importantly, destructive for parties and their children.28  The clear trend 
in family law disputes is away from adversarial forums and toward media-
tion, conferencing, and other ADR approaches.29  Court-facilitated mediation 
                                                          
L.Q. 3 (1998); see also Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurispru-
dence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775, 775 (1997) 
(noting that the legal realism movement underpins support for therapeutic courts); Penelope Eileen 
Bryan, “Collaborative Divorce:” Meaningful Reform or Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 1001, 1003 n.5 (1999). 
 25.  Marsha B. Freeman, Love Means Always Having to Say You’re Sorry: Applying the Real-
ities of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Family Law, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 215, 237 (2008).  Like 
collaboration, mediation attempts to help families manage the emotional aspects of dissolution of a 
relationship.  Id. 
 26.  Babb, supra note 24, at 779–800; Ross, supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 27.  Concurrent histories locate the beginning of collaborative divorce in Minnesota with the 
work of lawyer Stuart Webb or with psychologist Peggy Thompson in California.  Webb writes that 
he coined the phrase “collaborative law” and reached out to other lawyers to join him in “play[ing] 
the collaborative game.”  Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its History 
and Current Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 157 (2008).  The basis of collaborative 
divorce in California began with a team of psychologists, therapists, and attorneys influenced by 
the 1997 book Divorce: A Problem to be Solved, Not a Battle to be Fought.  KAREN FAGERSTROM 
ET AL., DIVORCE: A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED, NOT A BATTLE TO BE FOUGHT (1997); see also Mar-
sha Baucom, Collaborative Divorce, 41 ORANGE COUNTY LAW., 18, at *28 (1999), WL 41-JUL 
OCLAW 18 (discussing the influence of Fagerstrom’s theory).   
 28.  Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 324, 325 
(2004); see also CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS 33 (2014) (“The children of high-conflict divorce struggled with painful feelings 
of anger, grief, and distress, and were uncertain and self-conscious about their own intimate rela-
tionships.” (citing Robert E. Emery, The Consequences of Divorce for Children: Post Divorce Fam-
ily Life for Children, in THE POST DIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING, AND SOCIETY 16 
(Ross A. Thompson & Paul R. Amato eds., 1999)). 
 29.  See generally Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with 
the Court on Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and their Children: Who Needs What Kind 
of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453, 453 (2000). 
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became popular during the 1980s for settling custody disputes, as did volun-
tary mediation through a neutral facilitator in the 1990s.30  Several states now 
either require or encourage mediators to assist parties in resolving their prop-
erty, support, and custody issues before court intervention.31  And, there is 
evidence that mediation has smoothed divorce processes for couples and re-
duced custody conflict for parents.32 
Collaboration, similar to mediation, refashions divorce “as primarily a 
social and emotional process, rather than a legal event” and neutralizes con-
flict by tailoring the process to each client and his or her emotional needs.33  
Collaborative divorce is nevertheless distinct from mediation and other forms 
of ADR in many ways—parties conclude settlement negotiations before fil-
ing, for example.34  And, unlike mediation, collaborative divorce promises an 
“interdisciplinary team approach that . . . offer[s] divorcing couples a con-
sistent, positive, supportive, contained system for working with mental health 
and financial professionals on divorce-related issues.”35 
The next Section identifies the various components of collaborative di-
vorce, and, specifically, the content of the participation agreement. 
                                                          
 30.  Freeman, supra note 25, at 219; cf. Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best In-
terests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203 (2004); 
Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusiasm with Cau-
tion, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 436 (2002) (noting the coercive aspect of mediation compelled by a 
court). 
 31.  See John Lande, The Revolution in Family Law Dispute Resolution, 24 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 411, 424 (2012). 
 32.  Some empirical research has found that settlement rates are higher in mediation and that 
children have better relationships with non-residential parents over the long term.  E.g., Robert E. 
Emery et al., Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22, 26, 30–31 (2005) 
(finding such results twelve years after mediation).  However, that research did not find differences 
between mediated and non-mediated processes with regard to the psychological health of either 
party or an improvement in the relationship between ex-spouses.  Id. at 31–32.  
 33.  Singer, supra note 22, at 364.  Marsha Baucom, for example, describes traditional divorce 
as “notoriously adversarial,” managed by family courts that are “incredibly overloaded and under-
staffed” and are unable to offer “legal, financial and emotional help.”  Baucom, supra note 27, at 
*29–30.   
 34.  Rebecca Aviel, Counsel for the Divorce, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2014) (distinguish-
ing mediation and collaborative divorce); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection 
on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 148–49 (2004). 
 35.  Tesler, supra note 28, at 330–31.  Tesler argues that collaborative divorce responds to the 
shortcomings of mediation, including “[t]he lack of built-in advice and [neutral] advocacy during 
negotiations,” and “[t]he emotional and other imbalances between spouses trying to bargain face-
to-face in one of life’s most stressful passages.”  Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New 
Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 967, 973 (1999) (emphasis omitted) 
[hereinafter Tesler, A New Paradigm].   
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1.  The Participation Agreement 
To establish a team approach, everyone who participates in collabora-
tion—the clients, lawyers, and neutral professionals—must sign a participa-
tion agreement.36  The non-lawyer professionals on a team can include a li-
censed mental health professional or “divorce coach” (usually a psychologist 
or clinical social worker), a child specialist or parenting coordinator (also 
typically a psychologist), and a neutral financial specialist or accountant.37  
With the advice of attorneys, parties pick the professionals they need, and the 
specialists work with the lawyers who explain the legal framework to their 
clients.38  Because collaboration happens entirely out of court, the team urges 
parties to reach a settlement agreement fitted to their particular situation and 
not shaped only or primarily by state divorce laws.39  Pauline Tesler, a 
founder and leader of the collaborative divorce movement, explains that her 
“clients [have] an opportunity to seek consensus based on highest shared val-
ues for the restructured family after the divorce rather than on what a judge 
might or might not decide, and . . . professional services . . . can keep them 
moving toward their values-driven goals.”40 
The participation agreement governs how collaborative negotiations 
will operate.  The process consists of a series of meetings: the parties and 
their lawyers meet, each party meets individually with each expert, and the 
entire group meets once or twice (or more, as needed).  The team shares a 
self-enforced “commitment to keep the process honest, respectful, [private], 
and productive for both sides.”41  A participation agreement requires parties 
to disclose all material information, actively participate in settlement confer-
ences and team meetings, keep communications and documents confidential, 
and negotiate in good faith.42  Collaborative guidelines and rules describe the 
concept of “good faith” in terms of the conduct clients must avoid, such as 
                                                          
 36.  See, e.g., Kelly McClure & Chris Meuse, Family Law for the Non-Family Specialist: How 
to Master Conversations on Family Law, ADVOC. STATE B. LITIG. SEC. REP., Spring 2012, at 3.  
Out-of-court negotiations can always occur without the assistance of collaborative divorce profes-
sionals if a divorcing couple drafts a settlement agreement because they agree about custody, prop-
erty, or support duties.  And many divorcing couples cannot afford to hire lawyers in any case.  See 
infra Part III.B (discussing the costs of collaborative divorce).   
 37.  Webb, supra note 27, at 165. 
 38.  Baucom, supra note 27, at 29. 
 39.  Pauline H. Tesler, Informed Choice and Emergent Systems at the Growth Edge of Collab-
orative Practice, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 239, 241–42 (2011). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 975. 
 42.  Webb, supra note 27, at 160–61; Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 975 n.22.  
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threatening litigation, misleading the other party, or failing to disclose perti-
nent information.43  Specifically, the parties pledge to provide complete and 
accurate financial information and agree that information will be reviewed 
by a financial neutral.44  Parties have no right to court-designated, expert val-
uation of the marital assets, and they waive application of court discovery 
rules.45 
The withdrawal or disqualification provision is the “universal and nec-
essary element”46 or “the engine that drives collaborative law.”47  If the pro-
cess breaks down, both attorneys, and all neutral professionals, agree to with-
draw from the case and refrain from further representation of either party 
against the other.48  The financial and emotional costs of starting over with 
new representation are usually significant.49  Tesler described the potential 
cost of starting again as the “factor [that] can keep parties working toward 
                                                          
 43.  The New Jersey Family Collaborative Law Act of 2014 is illustrative of this point.  N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23D-7(b) (West Supp. 2016).  The Act provides seven ways to terminate the col-
laborative process:  
(1) a party gives notice to other parties in a record, with or without cause; or  
(2) a party files a document without agreement from other parties that initiates a court 
proceeding related to the dispute; or  
(3) either party obtains or is subject to a restraining order against the other party; or  
(4) an emergency relief action to protect the health, safety, welfare, or interests of a party 
is commenced; or  
(5) a party discharges a family collaborative lawyer, unless as is allowed under the Act; 
or  
(6) a party fails to provide relevant information and the other party decides to terminate 
the process as a result; or  
(7) a collaborative lawyer ceases to further represent a party. 
Id. 
 44.  See, e.g., PA. BAR INST., supra note 16, at 135, 137. 
 45.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 976.  For example, the Pennsylvania Bar model 
participation agreement notifies the client that he or she waives the right “to formally object to 
producing any documents or providing any [material] information.”  PA. BAR INST., supra note 16, 
at 126. 
 46.  Webb, supra note 27, at 168. 
 47.  Spain, supra note 34, at 143. 
 48.  The Uniform Collaborative Law Act makes a disqualification clause mandatory in order to 
apply the protections of the Act.  UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIFORM 
COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 9 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010), 
reprinted in 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 163 (2014).  The Act provides that “[a] collaborative lawyer is dis-
qualified from appearing before a tribunal to represent a party in a proceeding related to the collab-
orative matter.”  Id.  There are two exceptions to this mandate.  A collaborative lawyer may repre-
sent a party “(1) to ask a tribunal to approve an agreement resulting from the collaborative law 
process; or (2) to seek or defend an emergency order to protect the health, safety, welfare, or interest 
of a party . . . if a successor lawyer is not immediately available to represent that person.”  Id.   
 49.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 976.  Per some agreements, withdrawing coun-
sel is permitted to assist in the transition to another, non-collaborative lawyer.  Id.  
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resolution of their differences; without it, they might find themselves in an 
avoidable trial.”50 
The team structure, self-regulation, and threat of attorney withdrawal 
have led some commentators to question how collaborative lawyers can ful-
fill their professional responsibilities.  A participation agreement requires at-
torneys to balance their commitment to work as a team with their professional 
duty to remain advocates for their clients.51  This provision did not neces-
sarily satisfy ethical concerns over the withdrawal provision.  Over the last 
decade, however, bar associations and professional organizations have issued 
guidance explaining how mandatory withdrawal provisions comport with 
ethical and professional rules.52  For example, the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued 
a formal opinion in 2007, stating that the disqualification provision is “not an 
agreement that impairs [the lawyer’s] ability to represent the client, but rather 
is consistent with the client’s limited goals for the representation” if the client 
has given informed consent.53  In addition to withdrawal provisions, several 
commentators have debated ethical issues for collaborative lawyers on the 
                                                          
 50.  Id.  With some participation agreements, “the parties can agree to submit designated, nar-
rowly limited issues for third-party decision by an arbitrator or privately retained judge, as long as 
both parties and both attorneys agree that doing so does not compromise the integrity of the collab-
orative process.”  Id. at 978 (footnotes omitted). 
 51.  Tesler notes that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct “instruct[s] that a lawyer 
may refer not only to the law, but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, and social 
factors that may be relevant to the clients’ situation.”  Pauline H. Tesler, Interdisciplinary Team 
Collaborative Practice: Transforming the Way Lawyers Understand and Deliver Conflict Resolu-
tion Services, in UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
NAVIGATING THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS, WORKING WITH CLIENTS, AND ANALYZING THE 
LATEST TRENDS 277, 294–95 (2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY 
LAW]. 
 52.  Frederick J. Glassman, Is Collaborative Family Law a Win-Win or a Lose-Lose? Reflec-
tions on the Screening of Clients and Timing for Lawyer Withdrawal or Termination, in 
UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW, supra note 51, at 205, 231–39. 
 53.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).  The ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct outline when lawyers can withdraw from a case.  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); Spain, supra note 34, at 162.  Rule 
1.16, which outlines mandatory and permissive counsel withdrawal, “appears to provide a basis for 
a collaborative lawyer to withdraw from further representation if an agreement is not reached.”  
Spain, supra note 34, at 162.  The withdrawing attorney, under ethical rules, must “take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests.”  UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW 
RULES & UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2010), reprinted in 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 106 (2014) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, r. 1.16(b)(1)).  But, under collaborative law agreements, the attorney is barred from “di-
vulging information or assisting the client in any subsequent litigation.”  Spain, supra note 34, at 
164–65.  The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility found the only 
negative state bar opinion unpersuasive, which was from Colorado (although the Litigation Section 
of the ABA has also voiced a negative opinion).  UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & 
UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, 48 FAM. L.Q. at 79–80.  
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scope of representation,54 limitations on zealous advocacy,55 confidential-
ity,56 and conflicts of interest.57 
These important issues have been thoroughly explored in other writings, 
and states largely address these questions through legislation, as described in 
the next Section.  Of interest to this Article, however, is the growing support 
for collaborative divorce among family law practitioners as well as its focus 
on conflict resolution and the parties’ emotional well-being.  It is difficult to 
measure the success of collaboration in meeting both goals; parties typically 
file a petition in court only at the completion of private negotiations and after 
an agreement is signed, leaving no trail of court orders or motions.  Collabo-
rative divorce’s adherents nevertheless appear convinced of its benefits and 
success.  The next Section describes the enthusiasm for collaborative divorce 
among its supporters. 
2.  The Collaborative Movement 
Practitioner materials describing collaborative divorce suggest that it is 
not just an alternative to litigation, but a thriving “grassroots movement” and 
“a worldwide phenomenon.”58  Collaborative lawyers and their organizations 
                                                          
 54.  Spain, supra note 34, at 160; see also J. Herbie DiFonzo, From Dispute Resolution to 
Peacemaking: A Review of Collaborative Divorce Handbook—Helping Families Without Going to 
Court by Forrest S. Mosten, 44 FAM. L.Q. 95, 102–03 (2010) (book review).  
 55.  Under the ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct attorneys are required to “[r]epresent 
a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 
EC 7-1 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also Spain, supra note 34, at 165.  
 56.  According to Larry Spain, “There is some uncertainty as to whether documents disclosed 
and statements made by participants in a collaborative law process would be protected by the con-
fidentiality provisions that may apply to other ADR procedures.”  Spain, supra note 34, at 169.  
Another scholar has argued:  
Clients may waive the right of confidentiality, and in a [collaborative divorce] proceeding 
each spouse must do just that.  In the retention agreement, the spouse gives up “the right 
to formally object to producing any documents or to providing any information to the 
other side that [the spouse’s lawyer] determine[s] is appropriate.”  The spouse authorizes 
the lawyer “to fully disclose all information which in [the lawyer’s] discretion must be 
provided to [the other] spouse and his or her lawyer.” 
Gary M. Young, Malpractice Risks of Collaborative Divorce, WIS. LAWYER, May 2002 (footnotes 
omitted) (first citing WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.6(a); WIS. STAT. § 905.11 (2002); then quoting PAULINE 
H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT 
LITIGATION 138 (2001); and then quoting id.), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/Wiscon-
sinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=75&Issue=5&ArticleID=228#z. 
 57.  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) allocates decisionmaking re-
sponsibility to the client, stating that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are 
to be pursued.”   Spain, supra note 34, at 171 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 
1.2(a)). 
 58.  Luke Salava, Collaborative Divorce: The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Advance of a 
Promising Solution in Marriage Dissolution, 48 FAM. L.Q. 179, 184–85 (2014); see also Tesler, 
supra note 51, at 290 (“Collaborative lawyers are now found in twenty nations.”). 
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generate training manuals, books, brochures, and websites that proclaim the 
virtues of the process59 and “commit significant resources to restructuring 
their [legal] practices in the collaborative vein.”60  Collaborative lawyers of-
ten join practice groups that work exclusively with other collaborative pro-
fessionals across local, state, and national networks.61  These attorneys share 
an identity rooted in the tenets of collaboration—to “become part of the so-
lution, not part of the problem.”62 
In 2001, Texas became the first state to pass legislation authorizing col-
laboration in family law matters and clarifying the procedural grounds for 
collaborative divorce.63  The Texas statute, which was repealed and replaced 
in 2011, begins: “It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable res-
olution of disputes, with special consideration given to disputes involving the 
parent-child relationship . . . .”64  The movement has gained traction on the 
national level since then.  Drafted in 2010, the Uniform Collaborative Law 
Act (“UCLA”) provides a model for statutory recognition of collaborative 
law and encourages uniformity in collaborative processes.65  As of 2016, fif-
teen states and the District of Columbia have passed laws that permit and 
encourage couples to pursue collaborative divorce, and many of those stat-
utes’ provisions overlap with the language of the UCLA.66  Several states are 
                                                          
 59.  Webb, supra note 27, at 160; see also Bryan, supra note 24, at 1011 n.52 (noting the sim-
ilarities in marketing rhetoric for mediation and collaborative divorce).  
 60.  Aviel, supra note 34, at 1119; Pauline H. Tesler, The Believing Game, the Doubting Game, 
and Collaborative Law: A Reply to Penelope Bryan, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1018, 1019 n.4 
(1999) (discussing the “considerable energy, creativity and resources” that went into a legislative 
proposal for restructuring California’s family law courts and procedures). 
 61.  See Webb, supra note 27, at 166 (discussing monthly gatherings with local collaborative 
divorce attorneys).  Webb also believes the benefits of collaborative divorce include networking 
and making professional friends.  Id.  
 62.  Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of 
Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 88. 
 63.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.001–.116 (West 2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 
(West 2006) (authorizing use of collaborative law processes in the dissolution of marriages) (re-
pealed 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0072 (West Supp. 2005) (authorizing use of collabora-
tive law processes in suits affecting the parent-child relationship) (repealed 2011); Spain, supra note 
34, at 151. 
 64.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.001. 
 65.  See UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT 
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010), reprinted in 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 
110 (2014).  
 66.  Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Legislative Fact Sheet—Collaborative 
Law Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Col-
laborative%20Law%20Act (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).  For example, West Virginia’s statute draws 
heavily from the UCLA.  See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5A-101 (LexisNexis 2015). 
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considering similar legislation, and supporters argue that collaborative di-
vorce is transportable and adaptable across jurisdictions regardless of differ-
ences among states’ substantive and procedural family laws.67 
An international umbrella organization—the International Academy of 
Collaborative Practitioners (“IACP”)—promotes collaborative divorce glob-
ally.68  The IACP publishes training standards for collaborative lawyers, rec-
ommending a minimum of twelve hours of basic collaborative training and 
at least thirty hours of training in “client-centered, facilitative conflict reso-
lution.”69  Notably, “by 2010, IACP had approximately 5,000 members from 
twenty nations . . . offering services to clients in nearly every US state and 
Canadian province, as well as major cities across the UK, Ireland, and Aus-
tralia.”70 
While collaborative divorce is gaining momentum, evidence of its ef-
fectiveness is mixed.  On the one hand, supporters describe collaborative di-
vorce as an unqualified success story.  Tesler states that clients are rarely 
disappointed with the collaborative model.71  Participating professionals em-
phasize that collaborative divorce is less expensive, time consuming, and 
stressful than litigation.72  Collaborative practitioners likewise testify to the 
speed of the process, contending that “whereas traditional divorces 
can take an average of eighteen months to complete, a typical collaborative 
divorce can take a mere eighteen weeks or less to settle.”73  Supporters further 
assert that collaborative settlements are fairer than court-managed settle-
ments because “all of the parties’ resources are being devoted to a fair and 
equitable outcome for both sides, and no money or time is wasted on prepar-
ing for a trial no one wants to take part in.”74  Unlike a process managed by 
a court, collaborative attorneys highlight the benefits of confidentiality for 
their clients, who can negotiate and settle their affairs with privacy.75 
                                                          
 67.  Tesler, supra note 28, at 317. 
 68.  Id. at 332. 
 69.  Richard W. Shields, On Becoming a Collaborative Professional: From Paradigm Shifting 
to Transformative Learning Through Critical Reflection and Dialogue, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 427, 
433–34. 
 70.  Tesler, supra note 51, at 281. 
 71.  See Tesler, supra note 60, at 1021 (“If there are growing ranks of unhappy, poorly served 
clients who have entered into disadvantageous agreements because of pressures arising from the 
collaborative law model, I would expect to have heard about them.  I have not.”).  
 72.  Tesler, supra note 62, at 111 n.52. 
 73.  Salava, supra note 58, at 187. 
 74.  Nancy K. Brodzki, Reaching a Successful Outcome Through Collaborative Family Law, 
in UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW, supra note 51, at 195, 201. 
 75.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 970–72, 970 n.13; see also Tesler, supra note 
28, at 327–28 (“In most U.S. jurisdictions, litigated court proceedings and files (including those of 
cases that ultimately settle) are open to the public and all vestiges of privacy are lost, at the same 
time that matters formerly decided privately by the couple are handed placed [sic] under the control 
of disinterested and busy professionals.”).  But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
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On the other hand, it is not clear that litigation is a useful comparator.  
First, as noted, most divorcing couples do not engage in litigation and rely on 
other court-based and non-court mediation tools.76  Very few divorces are 
litigated because few parties can afford the costs of attorneys or have enough 
assets that would make such costs worthwhile.77  Moreover, evidence of the 
cost-effectiveness of collaborative divorce is unavailable or difficult to find.78  
It seems clear, however, that collaborative divorce can be expensive.79  Be-
cause there are no motions filed and the process is, by design, client-tailored, 
it is also difficult to measure how long the typical collaborative negotiation 
takes.  The speed of a collaborative divorce depends on the parties’ behavior 
and schedules.  Usually absent from the collaborative timeline, for example, 
is the time and cost of any modification, interpretation, or post-divorce nego-
tiation of a settlement agreement.  Although research is scarce on the topic, 
small-sample studies suggest that some parties resort to courts to modify their 
custody and financial arrangements, potentially thwarting the goals of final-
ity, cost-savings, and speed, or abandon the collaborative process to begin 
                                                          
1073, 1088–89 (1984) (“Many of the factors that lead a society to bring social relationships that 
otherwise seem wholly private (e.g., marriage) within the jurisdiction of a court, such as imbalances 
of power or the interests of third parties, are also likely to make settlement problematic.  Settlement 
is a poor substitute for judgement; it is an even poorer substitute for the withdrawal of jurisdiction.”). 
 76.  For example, Tesler concedes that over ninety percent of divorces conclude with a settle-
ment rather than with litigation.  Tesler, supra note 62, at 94. 
 77.  See infra Part III.B (noting that most couples in a divorce do not have sufficient assets to 
retain two lawyers (or even one lawyer) and that marriage is stratified by income and educational 
level).  Jane Murphy and Jana Singer highlighted the cost of collaborative divorce as particularly 
burdensome for low-income families and called for experimentation with community-based ser-
vices, different types of dispute resolution processes, like “evaluative mediation,” and training in 
collaboration for lawyers that serve these clients.  MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 130–32, 
137–39.  Murphy and Singer describe a clinic at the University of Denver Law School, which pro-
vides intensive mediation, counseling and integrated clinic services at affordable rates.  Id. at 132. 
 78.  FORREST S. MOSTEN, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE HANDBOOK: HELPING FAMILIES 
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT 64 (2009) (“[T]here appear to be no data showing [collaborative di-
vorce] is less expensive than traditional lawyer-negotiated settlements . . . and no data comparing 
the cost of collaborative divorce to mediation, even with consulting attorneys”); see also McClure 
& Meuse, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that the advantages of collaborative divorce are paying for 
privacy (not airing out the details of divorce in court), timing the divorce to the parties’ schedules, 
keeping the process “civilized and dignified,” and reducing costs as compared to adversarial litiga-
tion). 
79. Baucom, supra note 27, at *33 (citing the costs of up to $425 per hour).  A 2012 source 
estimates that “two attorneys at $300-$500 per hour each, along with a psychotherapist and finan-
cial advisor at $150 per hour each, would cost $900-$1300 per hour.”  Luke Salava, Collaborative 
Divorce—Unknown, Unwanted, or Unneeded? The Underwhelming Advance of a Promising So-
lution in Marriage Dissolution 12 n.64 (Jan. 2, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2367999; see also Williams, supra note 7 (“People 
think they’ll save money going through the divorce in a collaborative process, and it’s a big sell 
for them.  But I’ve had clients come here after a collaborat[iv]e process has failed.  They say that 
they tried working it out, and now they’re starting over, and so they’re spending more money.” 
(quoting Carolyn Mirabile, a partner at the family law practice Weber Gallagher)). 
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again.80  To the last point, there is unreliable and insufficient information 
about how often collaboration fails.81 
In sum, and contrary to the claims in collaborative literature, some cli-
ents do not view the costs of collaborative divorce as reasonable and were 
dissatisfied with the process.82  When faced with criticisms of steep price or 
prolonged process, supporters of collaborative divorce respond that the ap-
peal of collaboration is not just speed and cost savings.83  The reward of col-
laborative divorce is its transformative potential for clients and attorneys.  
Extolling the benefits for lawyers, Marsha Baucom asked and answered, 
“Why do it?  To save yourself!”84  Stuart Webb similarly proclaimed, “I can 
testify to the fact that it has also transformed the quality of my life!”85  This 
transformation is, in part, the result of collaboration’s therapeutic component: 
lawyers shed their disillusion with divorce litigation and “embrace an identity 
as a member of a ‘helping profession’” that assists parties in navigating the 
emotional trauma of divorce.86  The next Section explores the role of conflict 
resolution in the collaborative process and examines the communication and 
psychoanalytic skills that collaborative lawyers—and their clients—are ex-
pected to learn. 
B.  Therapeutic Benefits for Participants 
Two uncontroversial premises are the foundation of collaborative di-
vorce: first, divorce is a trying and entangling event, and second, the tradi-
tional legal system does not attend to parties’ emotional or mental well-being.  
Tesler begins her foundational text on collaborative divorce by describing 
dissolution as an “emotional trauma second only to the death of a spouse, and 
to involve a grief and recovery process that parallels the stages of recovery 
from death of a loved one.”87  The problem is that litigation does not (and 
                                                          
 80.  See, e.g., Gregg Herman, Family Law: Why Are There Fewer Collaborative Divorce Fil-
ings?, WIS. L.J. (June 8, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://wislawjournal.com/2011/06/08/why-are-there-
fewer-collaborative-divorce-filings/. 
 81.  Id.  For example, two studies of collaborative divorce in a Wisconsin county revealed that 
collaboration failed to produce an agreement in eleven percent of cases in 2008 and almost eighteen 
percent in 2014.  Id. 
82. Salava, supra note 79, at 18–19, 18 nn.96–97 (describing studies on the cost of and client 
satisfaction with the collaborative process).   
 83.  Tesler, supra note 60, at 1018.  Tesler argues that, “Collaborative lawyers increasingly 
describe qualitative differences in process and outcome between the settlements they have facili-
tated via collaboration and those they have facilitated via mediation or friendly negotiations.”  Tes-
ler, supra note 62, at 101.  
 84.  Baucom, supra note 27, at *32. 
 85.  Webb, supra note 27, at 169. 
 86.  Tesler, supra note 28, at 318. 
 87.  Id. at 321.  Clare Huntington similarly writes: “Divorce . . . is generally understood to be 
one of the greatest emotional upheavals in a lifetime.”  HUNTINGTON, supra note 28, at 84. 
 564 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:547 
 
perhaps cannot) incorporate the “relational and long term interests” of di-
vorcing parties.88  The family court system, according to Tesler, “wreak[s] 
unintended anti-therapeutic consequences of considerable magnitude on the 
families passing through it, with damaging societal effects that are only be-
ginning to be understood and measured.”89  Collaborative divorce, however, 
includes and values couples’ experience of grief, anxiety, and anger.  Martha 
Ertman argues, for example, that collaborative divorce “honors the role of 
emotions in disputes by including mental health professionals as necessary 
to help divorcing spouses work through any fear, anger, or other fiery emo-
tions that get in the way of resolving the financial and legal disputes.”90   
One goal of collaborative divorce is to create “an atmosphere of hon-
esty, cooperation, integrity, and professionalism geared toward the future 
well-being of the family.”91  But, collaborative divorce promises more than 
just civility and professionalism; it also addresses disagreements that gave 
rise to the marital split as well as conflicts that might persist after the di-
vorce.92  Writings on collaboration proclaim the process’s transformative po-
tential—from “restructuring of highly significant intimate personal relation-
ships” to incorporating “ethical or religious beliefs about fairness, 
appropriate dispute-resolution procedures, forgiveness, and personal ac-
countability” and “preserv[ing] the most positive post-divorce” relation-
ship.93  Collaboration looks both to the past and to the future, resolving con-
flicts in order to build a better relationship for the benefit of the parties and 
their children. 
To meet these goals, the collaborating parties are expected to develop 
communication and coping skills.  In the participation agreement, clients 
pledge to “resolve or minimize the negative emotional and behavioral dy-
namics that contribute to conflict.”94  Checklists for clients in collaborative 
manuals include steps to resolve issues “with dignity” and privacy, “to be-
come more stable emotionally,” and “to atone for the harm . . . caused.”95  
Parties agree to make compromises and “meet the fundamental needs” of the 
                                                          
 88.  Tesler, supra note 28, at 327–28.  
 89.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 995.  
 90.  MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL & INFORMAL CONTRACTS 
SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 169 (2015).  Solangel Maldonado argues that no-fault divorce, 
though intended to reduce acrimony between divorcing spouses by eliminating grounds that 
prompted blame and punishment does not end conflict because it deprives the “betrayed or abused 
spouse” the forum to express “anger, indignation, and desire for revenge.”  Solangel Maldonado, 
Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
441, 460, 465 (2008). 
 91.  MOSTEN, supra note 78, at 26.  
 92.  TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 5. 
 93.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 972. 
 94.  PA. BAR INST., supra note 16, at 136. 
 95.  WEBB & OUSKY, supra note 6, at 217.  
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other person.96  Mental health professionals or divorce coaches assist parties 
in making these compromises and understanding each other’s needs.  Ac-
cording to one training manual, divorce coaches listen to clients and validate 
their feelings, attempt to de-escalate conflict, and help a party discuss con-
tentious issues, like infidelity.97  For instance, a case study in a collaborative 
handbook directs divorce coaches to address the hurt caused by a husband’s 
affair and to help the unfaithful spouse apologize.98 
Building a post-divorce relationship may be particularly attractive to 
parents.  Collaborative divorce is marketed to couples with children who will 
stay in contact even though their intimate relationship has ended.99  Indeed, 
a consistent selling point for collaborative divorce is its attention to the emo-
tional well-being of children.100  Tesler argues that collaborative divorce al-
lows parents to work with a team “using a process that provides a safe vehicle 
for the voice of the child and a structure that insists on attention to their 
needs.”101  Thus, even if parties have deep conflict, collaboration seeks to 
resolve the parents’ differences so that their children do not experience tur-
moil or instability after divorce. 
However, all collaborative materials recognize that some people will be 
poor candidates for the process.  Individuals described as ill-suited for col-
laborative divorce include those “intent on exacting revenge,” “incapable of 
honesty,” or with “severe personality disorders and untreated mental health 
or substance abuse issues.”102  Almost all materials on collaborative divorce 
conclude that parties with a history of abuse should not choose collabora-
tion.103  The UCLA, for instance, directs lawyers to vet collaborative cases 
for signs of domestic or intimate partner violence.104  The justifiable concern 
                                                          
 96.  PA. BAR INST., supra note 16, at 137. 
 97.  SCHARFF & HERRICK, supra note 15, at 4, 25, 39, 74, 142, 148.  
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Brodzki, supra note 74, at 196.  Brodzki notes that, in contrast, “[c]ouples without any 
children have few ties once their relationship has ended, and therefore lack the incentive that couples 
with children have to maintain a level of cooperation and civility after the relationship has ended 
either in divorce or permanent separation in the case of unmarried couples.”  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Tesler, supra note 62, at 110 n.51. 
 102.  Brodzki, supra note 74, at 196.  Rachel Virk writes of picking clients: “When a party has 
borderline personality disorder, is narcissistic, is an active alcoholic or a ‘dry drunk,’ or is abusive 
or being abused, rationality does not usually carry the day.”  Rachel L. Virk, When Is Collaboration 
the Most Appropriate Method of Dispute Resolution in Divorce, and Why is it Beneficial to Collab-
orate?, in UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW, supra note 51, at 79, 81. 
 103.  But see Brodzki, Reaching a Successful Outcome Through Collaborative Family Law, in 
UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW, supra note 51, at 197 (“Individuals with severe 
personality disorders . . . present challenges to successful collaboration, but these challenges are not 
always insurmountable if the appropriate resources are available to address those issues.”).  
 104.  UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 15 
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010), reprinted in 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 
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is that an abusive party will manipulate or dominate the abused party in ne-
gotiations.105 
Interestingly absent from discussions of suitability for collaboration are 
people at a financial disadvantage to their spouses.  For parties with wealth 
disparities, collaborative attorneys argue that the financial neutral resolves 
any economic imbalance because “all of the financial information coming 
from the economically advantaged spouse will not only be presented, but will 
also be evaluated by the neutral expert for the benefit of the economically 
disadvantaged spouse.”106  In other words, the contractual and ethical obliga-
tions of full, honest disclosure under the participation agreement should bal-
ance the scales. 
The responsibility to vet clients highlights the special role that collabo-
rative lawyers assume.  Of note, collaborative lawyers receive training on 
meeting the needs of clients.  In his “how-to” manual, Stuart Webb provides 
a list of skills that a good collaborative lawyer should possess, including 
“[g]uarding against adversarial instincts. . . . total unconditional respect to all 
the participants[,] [d]ispelling negativism[,] [l]etting go of personal attach-
ment to the outcome[,]” and “[u]sing a natural sense of honesty and integrity 
to the process.”107  Beyond working as a team, collaboration requires a par-
ticular approach to client communication.108  Lawyers are expected to employ 
interpersonal skills and emotional intelligence.109  
                                                          
167 (2014).  Recently, however, some mediation materials have suggested that ADR processes 
should be available to couples with abusive histories, with procedural safeguards, precisely because 
of the couples’ level of conflict. 
 105.  Aviel, supra note 34, at 1127, 1140 (arguing that domestic violence makes a person a poor 
fit for either collaborative divorce or joint representation).  Ertman similarly argues that spouses 
subjected to abuse or who feel disempowered during the marriage are bad candidates for collabora-
tive divorce.  ERTMAN, supra note 90, at 171; see supra Part III.A (noting the critique of mediation 
for similar reasons). 
 106.  Glassman, supra note 52, at 205, 226.  
 107.  Webb, supra note 27, at 158–59.  
 108.  Tesler, supra note 51, at 282–83.  Tesler writes that: “Learning how to provide this new 
kind of professional legal conflict resolution service can’t be accomplished by reading a book, or 
even by attending trainings and workshops. . . . ‘On the job’ experience of a particular kind is what 
teaches lawyers how to facilitate deeper and more durable conflict resolution.”  Tesler, supra note 
39, at 242.   
 109.  Tesler, supra note 51, at 282–83.  Jane Murphy and Jana Singer describe shifting roles for 
lawyers as “healer[s]” and practitioners of “creative problem solving.”  MURPHY & SINGER, supra 
note 4, at 92–94.  Murphy and Singer note how judges play a therapeutic role by supporting collab-
orative programs and serving potentially as “‘coach,’ ‘social workers,’ ‘cheerleader,’ or ‘therapist.’”  
Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Victor E. Flango, Problem-Solving Courts under a Dif-
ferent Lens, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 42 (2007), http://cdm16501.con-
tentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/spcts/id/177; then quoting Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In 
Problem-Solving Court, Judges Turn Therapist, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.ny-
times.com/2005/04/26/nyregion/in-problemsolving-court-judges-turn-therapist.html?_r=0). 
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Tesler additionally believes that collaborative professionals (lawyers as 
well as other specialists) should become experts in certain aspects of psy-
chology.110  She explains: 
[L]awyers must learn psychological theory (including child devel-
opment, family dynamics, the dynamics of grief and bereavement, 
defense mechanisms, transference and countertransference, some 
exposure to differential diagnosis criteria for mental illness and 
character disorders) as well as some new psychological and com-
munications skills (nondirective interviewing and counseling 
skills, active listening, reframing, conflict management) and thor-
ough mastery of negotiating theory and technique.111 
In this vein, training manuals suggest lawyers should assess clients’ mood, 
state of mental health, and “capacity for rational thought.”112 
The list of traits that collaborative lawyers ideally develop and exhibit 
is long and, at least in part, aspirational.113  These skills presumably convert 
a family law practice into a life-changing experience.114  Lawyers are encour-
aged to push themselves to engage in self-reflection and self-growth,115 and 
become professionals that are “self-aware [and] self-reflective . . . [who] can 
do a better job of client-centered conflict resolution.”116   
While aspiring to possess all of these abilities, lawyers at the same time 
should make clear that they are not their clients’ therapists.  Instead, collab-
orative professionals should emphasize the role of parties’ emotions as a 
pragmatic means to overcome conflict for constructive, future-oriented 
ends.117  Whatever characteristics collaboration may share with therapeutic 
processes, conflict resolution strategies for divorcing parties can encourage 
the expression of remorse, guilt or anger—emotions that might have been 
previously channeled through fault grounds but now seem irrelevant for a no-
                                                          
 110.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 988. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  SCHARFF & HERRICK, supra note 15, at 85.   
 113.  Bryan, supra note 24, at 1012 n.57 (arguing that it would be difficult for most lawyers to 
act with all the skills collaborative materials suggest legal professionals should have). 
 114.  Tesler, A New Paradigm, supra note 35, at 969–70 (“The professionals in our culture who 
have been delegated the de facto responsibility for helping people dismantle and restructure their 
most sensitive, private, and emotionally charged human relationships are lawyers trained in a legal 
system devised to prosecute criminals and resolve disputes about money and property.”). 
 115.  TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 127.  
 116.  Tesler, supra note 39, at 241.  Webb argues that lawyers who have experience with medi-
ation will have a smoother transition to collaborative law than those who have no training in medi-
ation, because mediation is also client-centered and rooted in clients’ interests and goals.  Webb, 
supra note 27, at 158. 
 117.  See Baucom, supra note 27, at 31.  Marsha Baucom, for example, describes suitable clients 
as those who “want to protect their emotional and financial resources, get closure on the marriage 
and move on with their life.”  Id.  
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fault divorce.118  The next Part describes the transition from fault to no-fault 
divorce, as well as the changes to alimony and custody rules that happened 
concurrently with the enactment of no-fault statutes.  Gender-neutral lan-
guage and indeterminate standards helped dismantle the overtly sexist lega-
cies of the fault regime.  But many of these reforms, according to some fem-
inists and family law scholars, also hurt wives and mothers.  An out-of-court 
process like collaborative divorce circumvents some of these effects while at 
the same time appeals to those who see advantages in considering during-
marriage behavior in negotiating settlements. 
II.  COLLABORATION AS A FEMINIST PROJECT 
Collaborative divorce is neither a revolution nor a fringe movement; it 
reflects the family law reforms that have developed over the last forty 
years.119  This Part provides a short background on the shift from fault to no-
fault divorce and the corresponding changes in state alimony and custody 
rules.120  The transition to no-fault divorce mirrored a broader shift in mar-
riage from a status defined by sex to an egalitarian partnership.121  The pur-
pose in providing a snapshot of this well-known history is to highlight the 
persistence of gender stereotypes in assessing the relevance of spouses’ mis-
conduct.  This Part then summarizes feminist critiques of the contemporary 
no-fault system—specifically, the gender neutrality and the indeterminacy of 
alimony and custody laws—to highlight the argument that modern divorce 
                                                          
 118.   See GREGG HERMAN, SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES IN FAMILY LAW: A 
GUIDE TO IMPROVED TACTICS AND RESOLUTION 31 (2013).  A guide on settlement negotiations 
for lawyers repeats the problems of omitting or erasing emotions in no-fault divorce: “Sometimes 
clients just want to be heard.  Even though most states are ‘no fault,’ many clients are not emotion-
ally there.”  Id.  
 119.  Countless books and articles have addressed the transition from a fault-based divorce sys-
tem to a no-fault regime, and the changing status of marriage.  See generally JOANNA L. GROSSMAN 
& LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 167 (2011). 
 120.  This Article only briefly summarizes the transition to no-fault divorce and does not attempt 
to summarize the voluminous commentary on the subject.  For histories of no-fault divorce, see the 
pioneering scholarship of Herma Hill Kay.  See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the 
Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the 
Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2061 (2000) [hereinafter Hill Kay, Second Sex]; Herma 
Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27 
(2002); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Af-
termath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
 121.  For leading scholarship on the evolving nature of marriage, see generally STEPHANIE 
COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED 
MARRIAGE (2005), STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND 
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992), and NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND 
THE NATION (2000); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2002). 
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reform backfired against wives.  The perceived shortcomings of no-fault di-
vorce strengthen arguments for privately managed processes that allow par-
ties to contract around the harsher application of divorce laws by courts.122 
A.  From Fault to No-Fault and Egalitarian Marriage 
Under the fault regime, “mutual misery,” as termed by Lawrence Fried-
man, was not a sufficient ground for divorce.123  Spouses could divorce only 
if they suffered marital wrongs that made cohabitation and consortium im-
possibly difficult.124  Typical grounds included adultery, cruelty, desertion or 
abandonment, impotence and insanity.125  But, courts routinely bent fault 
grounds to grant divorces to unhappy couples.126  The gap between what law 
required as a cause of action and what courts actually permitted became wider 
with the rampant collusion of parties who manufactured grounds for di-
vorce.127 
The consequences of dissolution and collusion fell on women and men 
in notoriously gendered ways.  First, as Friedman documents, “[w]ives, not 
husbands, brought actions of divorce, and, in some jurisdictions, overwhelm-
ingly so.”128  Second, wives as plaintiffs “had to allege some evil act—adul-
tery, cruelty, or desertion. . . . [because] it was socially acceptable for a 
woman to be a victim.”129  In contrast, “[i]t was difficult for a man to claim 
he was deceived, deserted, or beaten up by a woman.”130  Thus, fault grounds 
perpetuated gender stereotypes: “women [told] stories about themselves as 
innocent victims; the men they married [were] cruel or adulterous worms. 
                                                          
 122.  Compare Bryan, supra note 24, at 1011 n.51 (“At its inception feminists saw mediation as 
a way for women to avoid the male-biased substantive divorce laws and achieve more favorable 
settlements.”), with Singer, supra note 4, at 1504–06 (noting the narrative propounded by mediation 
advocates: the shift to no-fault divorce was a shift from state control of exit from marriage to indi-
vidual control, which also enabled private processes to flourish, permitting divorcing individuals to 
refashion gender roles). 
 123.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-
Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (2000).  
 124.  See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 274–75 
(5th ed. 2014) (summarizing typical fault grounds in state laws).  
 125.  Id. at 274–76. 
 126.  But see Friedman, supra note 123, at 1509–10 (listing cases where divorce was denied to 
unhappy couples). 
 127.  Id. at 1504.  Perhaps the most famous example of collusion concerned New York couples, 
who had a limited number of grounds for divorce, but adultery was one of them.  Parties who wanted 
a divorce would fabricate adultery, almost always by the husband, and submit manufactured evi-
dence as proof of an affair.  Id. at 1512–13; see also Lawrence Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce 
Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 662, 666–67 (1984), as reprinted in HARRIS, 
CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 124, at 280. 
 128.  Friedman, supra note 123, at 1524 (citing ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE 
IN CALIFORNIA, 1850–1890, at 29–30 (1982)). 
 129.  Id. at 1525. 
 130.  Id.  
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The standard practice cast[ed] the men as villains.”131  Fault also helped con-
struct and sustain narratives about the types of relationship harms that led to 
divorce.  Only certain kinds of betrayals mattered—sexual infidelity, physi-
cal abuse, or abandonment, for example—and these forms of fault (commit-
ted or proffered) were totalizing in their destructive effect on a marriage. 
Feminists in equal rights campaigns, along with sociologists and court 
reformers, understood fault divorce as a legacy from coverture that epito-
mized and maintained gender roles for husbands and wives.132  In brief, cov-
erture was a common law status that treated a husband and a wife as a single 
legal personality.133  This so-called myth of marital unity was a justification 
for prohibiting divorce, although law never treated husbands and wives as 
one legal person to the extent that the concept implied.134  However, the du-
ties of men and women in marriage were traditionally gendered, with women 
owing obedience to husbands and men owing financial support to wives.135  
Insofar as divorce grounds evolved from these gendered responsibilities, sec-
ond-wave feminists contested how fault perpetuated women’s dependency 
on men.136  Beginning in the late 1960s, states revised divorce laws by re-
moving fault requirements or adding a no-fault ground, allowing husbands 
and wives equal opportunity to exit marriages.137  Feminist advocacy sup-
ported no-fault divorce as well as reforms to laws governing property divi-
sion and alimony.138 
                                                          
 131.  Id. at 1525, 1528. 
 132.  Hill Kay, Second Sex, supra note 120, at 2032–33; see also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, su-
pra note 119, at 164, 193. 
 133.  See Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 111 n.96 (2005). 
 134.  HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 124, at 33–34; see also Friedman, supra 
note 127, at 653 (“In other words, legislatures recognized the need for an efficient way to dissolve 
a marriage, but the enacted statutory schemes were never too efficient.  They were, in short, com-
promises between two genuine social demands, which were in hopeless conflict. One was a demand 
that the law lend moral and physical force to the sanctity and stability of marriage.”).  
 135.  Singer, supra note 4, at 1474. 
 136.  For a more detailed account of the transition from coverture, see Serena Mayeri, Marriage 
(In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 129 (2015).  May-
eri concludes: “By the 1980s, as a matter of formal law—though not of social reality—feminist 
advocacy made marriage a gender-neutral institution, a presumptively equal partnership of spouses 
with identical, reciprocal legal rights and responsibilities.”  Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 
99 (1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)). 
 137.  JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 104 (2014).  The role of feminist activ-
ism in early divorce reform, however, is contested.  Hill Kay wrote, “family law reforms that began 
in the mid-twentieth century were conceived, and largely drafted, without the active participation 
of an organized women’s movement.”  Hill Kay, Second Sex, supra note 120, at 2035; see also 
Singer, supra note 4, at 1518 n.352. 
 138.  See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 201 (locating feminist principles as the 
source of change in alimony laws).  Particularly, “proponents embraced the concept that the [Equal 
Rights Amendment] would mandate equal treatment in the financial aspects of divorce, in particular 
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The feminist influence on law reform is evident in no-fault laws’ appli-
cation.  Early in the life of no-fault divorce reform, social workers, judges, 
lawyers, and others called for a process that emphasized counseling in order 
to thwart or slow down separation.139  Ultimately, however, no-fault grounds 
evolved to permit unilateral exit from marriage based on either spouse’s al-
legation of irretrievable breakdown or irreconcilable differences.140  As Janet 
Halley demonstrates, this marked a major shift in the field of domestic rela-
tions—away from an area of law organized to deliver social services so as to 
mitigate the harms caused by divorce.141  Feminist arguments for no-fault 
laws contested that divorce was the unraveling of the social fabric of society 
or indicative of the moral failings of spouses; feminists did not support di-
vorce reform that dwelled on reconciliation or on saving a marriage.142   
No-fault divorce swept the country as the popular perception (as well as 
the legal definition) of marriage was changing from a permanent, hierarchal 
institution to a reciprocal and egalitarian relationship.143  Liberal feminist val-
ues emphasized the ways in which equality in marriage and at divorce could 
enable women to reject caregiving roles and to pursue advancement in public 
life on the same footing with men.144  With no-fault rules, women could exit 
                                                          
the obligation of support during marriage, the award of spousal support after separation, and prop-
erty division.”  Hill Kay, Second Sex, supra note 120, at 2060 (citing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY 
WE LOST THE ERA 91–98 (1986)).  Drawing from the work of the California Women’s Commis-
sion, California was one of the first states to “expand the financial power of wives by more nearly 
equalizing their managerial rights with those of their husbands consistent with the call for equal 
rights.”  Id. at 2061. 
 139.  See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 174 (“Many experts wanted to get rid of 
collusion and replace it with something more ‘therapeutic,’ something more in tune with human and 
family values.”). 
 140.  HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 124, at 281–83.  All states now have a no-
fault ground, such as irretrievable breakdown or irreconcilable differences; some states added no-
fault grounds to the existing fault grounds and some states repealed fault divorce and replaced it 
with no-fault causes of action.  Id. at 283. 
 141.  Id. at 269. 
 142.  Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 
269–70 (2011).   
 143.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the evolving state of marriage); see 
also Kerry Abrams, Family History: Inside and Out, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2013) (review-
ing GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119); Hill Kay, Second Sex, supra note 120, at 2019 (“The 
movement of twentieth century family law in the United States has been away from a patriarchal 
model and toward a more egalitarian one.”).  
 144.  Singer, supra note 4, at 1520.  “No-fault, in the public and academic mind, was associated 
with a generation of liberal women, and other women were hesitant to break ranks.”  JUNE 
CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 21 (2000). 
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marriage and win an equal share of marital assets without proving victim-
hood.145  Alimony and custody laws began to shed their gendered underpin-
nings, too, as statutes incorporated gender-neutral language.146  Fault laws, in 
theory, compensated the wronged spouse through support awards as well as 
potentially penalized the wrongdoer with the loss of child custody.147  As 
noted, wives petitioned for divorce more often than husbands, and wives 
were more likely to allege and prove fault.148  In some jurisdictions, only 
women could receive alimony.149  Moreover, alimony theoretically replaced 
the permanent financial support that husbands owed to wives if marriage was 
a lifelong duty rather than a romantic tie that could be broken.150  Unilateral 
exit from marriage supported a clean-break approach to alimony: once a mar-
riage was over, so were the obligations of support between spouses, which 
were duties no longer defined by sex at law.151  And, gender neutrality meant 
                                                          
 145.  ERTMAN, supra note 90, at 166 (“Today, thanks to advocacy by both feminists and men’s 
rights groups, family law treats spouses as equal partners instead of assigning rights and duties 
according to gender.”). 
 146.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 930 (writing “alimony has been debated in every 
era . . . .  As the status of women changes, so do the assumptions that underlie the debate, sometimes 
in subtle ways.”). 
 147.  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-
Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2538 (1994); see also Friedman, supra note 123, at 1521–22 (de-
scribing a case in which a wronged wife received alimony and sole custody).  Alimony was always 
rare and the need for alimony is hard to establish when both spouses contribute financially in mar-
riage.  June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Disso-
lution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 78 n.154 (2002) (noting “the 
difficulty of measuring career contributions”).  Even so, alimony today is still gendered: a very 
small number of alimony recipients are men.  CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: 
THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW 27 (2014). 
 148.  See D. KELLY WEISBERG, FAMILY LAW CODE, SELECTED STATES, AND ALI PRINCIPLES 
93 (2004) (“The traditional rationales for spousal support were need and fault. . . .”); Friedman, 
supra note 123, at 1525 (“[I]f the woman was to end up with children, with child support, with 
alimony, it helped immeasurably to cast her as the innocent party.”). 
 149.  The U.S. Supreme Court struck down several sex-specific family laws on equal protection 
grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278, 
283 (1979) (striking down a statute that “authorize[ed] the imposition of alimony obligations on 
husbands, but not on wives”).  These cases were part of broader and well-known litigation strategy 
over the 1960s and 1970s to undo sex discrimination in state and federal laws.  See HARRIS, 
CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 124, at 78–83. 
 150.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 935 (“No-fault divorce ended the insistence, however 
unconvincing it had become by the seventies and eighties, that marriage was a life-long relation-
ship.”).  Still, “breach of contract” justifications for alimony make sense if marriage is viewed as a 
covenant and not, according to Herma Hill Kay’s view, a “joint venture undertaken for limited pur-
poses and dissolvable by either party at will.”  See Carbone, supra note 147, at 77.  Carbone shows 
this with two hypothetical couples, one exiting marriage with “fault” and one without “fault.”  Id. 
at 73–75. 
 151.  WEISBERG, supra note 148, at 93.  The Weisberg family law casebook notes that “the 
purpose of spousal support has changed today, influenced largely by the women’s movement and 
the acceptability of no-fault divorce.”  Id.  However, and as noted again in Part III, alimony awards, 
especially permanent or long term support awards, were and are rare.  June Carbone and Naomi 
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that custody law should not explicitly favor mothers over fathers.152  Thus, 
along with no-fault, alimony and custody become untethered from the gen-
dered duties of an earlier era. 
In addition, custody and alimony laws gave courts power to order 
spousal support, to divide marital assets, and to award custody based on in-
determinate factors.153  That is, statutes governing property, alimony, and 
custody list numerous factors that courts must or should consider, and give 
judges ample discretion to apply those factors on a case-by-case basis.154  Per-
haps the most commonly-cited example of indeterminacy is the “best inter-
ests of the child” standard: 
Especially in contrast to the approaches it replaced, which provided 
fixed rules for child custody that were explicitly gender-based, the 
best-interests standard seems “wonderfully simple, egalitarian, and 
flexible”. . . .  [T]hese same commentators go on to assert that the 
standard “has no objective content” and “is not determinate enough 
to produce predictable results, yielding instead a process that is 
contentious, expensive, subjective, and unjust.”155 
After the introduction of no-fault divorce, family law scholars, writing 
from cultural feminist perspectives, began to argue that the combination of 
gender neutrality and indeterminacy in alimony and custody had backfired 
                                                          
Cahn have questioned the often-recounted story that it was the disappearance of fault, or gender-
neutral laws, that made alimony irrelevant.  Even when alimony was awarded, courts rarely treated 
it as “damages” for the innocent spouse.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 933–34. 
 152.  The trend over the last twenty years has been toward awarding joint or shared custody.  
HARRIS, CARBONE & TEITELBAUM, supra note 124, at 570.  Like alimony, gender neutrality in 
custody is also informed by court decisions applying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.  See id. at 78–83.   
 153.  See Thomas Oldham, Economic Consequences of Divorce in the United States: Recent De-
velopments, in FAMILY LAW IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA IN THE NEW CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF SANFORD KATZ 55 (John Eekelaar ed., 2016) (“Almost all states give divorce courts substantial 
discretion regarding both the decision to award support and the amount and duration of such 
awards.”).  Oldham notes that a few states have introduced guidelines or caps on amount and dura-
tion of alimony to limit judicial discretion.  Id. at 59. 
 154.  Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2011 
n.16 (2014); Lande, supra note 31, at 415 (“Although no-fault divorce, joint custody, and domestic 
violence laws have generally been quite appropriate as reflections of social norms and ideals of 
fairness, they often require difficult decisions using much vaguer legal standards than in the past.” 
(citing Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 977–80 (1979))).  For a summary of the debate over rules or standards 
in family law, see Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 9–14 (1990) (outlining consequences of moving to guidelines), and Jane C. 
Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 
70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 241–42 (1991). 
 155.  Aviel, supra note 154, at 2014 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting David L. Chambers, Re-
thinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481, 488 
(1984); and then quoting Katherine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 809, 849 (1998)). 
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against women.156  Rather than advance sex equality, alimony and custody 
laws could penalize caretakers who were predominantly women and whose 
work was undervalued.  As courts applied indeterminate alimony and custody 
laws to women’s disadvantage, negotiating around courts in ADR proceed-
ings was an increasingly available option.157  In this way, collaborative di-
vorce aligns with feminist ideas because it can give parties control over an 
indeterminate process so as to blunt the gendered effects of custody and sup-
port laws.158   
B.  Feminist Critiques of No-Fault Divorce 
The liberal feminist support for formal equality in divorce conflicted 
with competing concerns of what women were losing in the era of no-fault 
laws.  Two trends in custody and alimony have drawn feminist criticism be-
cause of laws’ gender neutrality: the rarity of alimony awards and presump-
tions for shared custody.159  Some feminist scholars suspected that formal 
equality and indeterminate standards allowed courts and lawyers to perpetu-
ate biases against women.160  Penelope Bryan, for example, argues that “[t]ra-
ditional lawyers afflicted with this bias [that wives should receive spousal 
                                                          
 156.  See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Fam-
ily Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 110–16 (2016) (arguing that legal sex neutrality may have 
entrenched or exacerbated sex inequality); see also CARBONE, supra note 144, at 193 (claiming that 
custody has “become ground zero in the gender wars”).  Jana Singer identified the intersection of 
no-fault divorce and shared custody as a “mixed message”: “A commitment to shared postdivorced 
parenting . . . sends a decidedly mixed message to divorcing and separating parents—your emo-
tional and economic partnership is over, but your parenting relationship remains intact.”  Singer, 
supra note 22, at 366.  
 157.  Naomi Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 249 (1997) 
(noting that with the “deletion of the vocabulary of fault” came a “recognition of private ordering”). 
 158.  Although collaborative divorce is a fairly new phenomenon, it is not immune from feminist 
critique.  See, e.g., Aviel, supra note 34, at 1119 (critiquing the assertion that collaborative divorce 
lawyers are a team and not individually oriented); see supra notes 21, 27 (citing scholarship that 
explores feminist cases against mediation); Bryan, supra note 24, at 1011 n.51 (arguing that equal 
control over the collaborative process is illusory because typically men maintain power in bargain-
ing and have more financial resources at divorce).  John Lande writes that the collaborative divorce 
bar is comprised mostly of women with a decade or more of practice experience: “60–70% of the 
collaborative lawyers are females with an average or median of 11–20 years in practice.”  Lande, 
supra note 31, at 430.  This suggests that many collaborative practitioners are from the cohort of 
women who entered the legal profession in the 1970s and 1980s.  Id.  Lande also notes that “females 
were more likely than males to be family law specialists; women constituted 33% of the overall 
sample [of lawyers] of the study but 67% of the lawyers whose practices involved three-quarters or 
more of divorce cases.”  Id. at 428. 
 159.  See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 194–95 
(2007) (“Many family law scholars view this revolution [to formal gender equality] as ‘the most 
significant and pervasive transformation’ of family law.” (quoting Appleton, supra note 133, at 
110)); Appleton, supra note 133, at 111 (“Today, however, explicit gender-based family laws have 
all but vanished.”). 
 160.  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 202.  Grossman and Friedman write: “Formal 
gender neutrality and no-fault made it easy for courts to limit or reduce alimony awards drastically.”  
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maintenance from husbands] frequently encourage or coerce their women 
clients into relinquishing their requests for maintenance.”161  Gender neutral-
ity and court discretion cut against long-term or permanent spousal support, 
even for wives who earned less than their husbands or had no income at all.  
Jill Hasday argues that courts consistently deny wives alimony for the pur-
ported reason of formal equality: “Since the 1970s, state courts deciding 
whether to award divorcing women alimony have repeatedly relied on the 
contention that family law has eradicated its roots in coverture.”162 
The gender neutrality that characterizes no-fault divorce also trans-
formed custody decisions, resulting in a “bittersweet victory.”163  On the one 
hand, standards-based, gender-neutral custody was, as Janet Halley writes, 
“part of a sweeping feminist-inspired law reform in which formal equality in 
marriage erased the rules of coverture one by one.”164  On the other hand, “a 
fully neutral principle meant that fathers . . . could lay claim to custody of 
children at the time of divorce and litigate it under a standard so open-ended 
and indeterminate that the outcome was, technically at least, completely un-
predictable.”165 
Whereas liberal feminists had argued for equality between men and 
women, cultural feminists asserted that formal equality put women in 
straightjackets.166  Martha Fineman, for example, urged that family law 
should abandon gender neutrality and formal equality, especially in regard to 
child care and child custody.167  If women remained responsible for the bulk 
                                                          
Id.; see also Bryan, supra note 24, at 1015 (contending permanent alimony for wives is appropriate 
in more instances than courts allow).  Janet Halley recognized this trend in an earlier edition of the 
family law casebook edited by Judith Areen and Milton C. Regan, Jr.: 
“To put it bluntly, the traditional division of labor within households often leaves the 
husband in better financial shape than the wife at the time of divorce,” and then offers a 
lengthy excerpt from a specifically feminist reconsideration of alimony.  The casebook 
follows this quite elegant synthesis of ostensibly opposed feminist positions with the ed-
itors’ own protracted denunciation of current property division and alimony law for di-
recting judges to consider too many contradictory factors . . . . 
Halley, supra note 142, at 284 (footnotes omitted) (quoting JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, 
JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 75 (5th ed. 2006); and then citing id. at 758–63). 
 161.  Bryan, supra note 24, at 1013 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Penelope Eileen Bryan, 
Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153 
(1999); and then citing In re Marriage of Harding, 545 N.E.2d 459, 469 (1989); In re Marriage of 
Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 620 (1991)). 
 162.  HASDAY, supra note 137, at 105, 115.  Carbone argued that alimony awards rest on nascent 
claims about one party’s breach of the marital contract: “Considerations of fault also continues to 
play a surprisingly influential if not always visible role.”  Carbone, supra note 147, at 55.  
 163.  Halley, supra note 142, at 274. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 38–42 (1995). 
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of children’s care in practice, treating mothers and fathers equally for the 
purposes of custody and support saddled women with caregiving without ad-
ditional financial assistance and forced them to submit to custody arrange-
ments that did not reflect the realities of child care.168  The problem was not 
just that law reinforced women’s roles as mothers or caregivers, but also that 
law and public institutions treated caregiving as their altruistic, expected (and 
thus uncompensated) duty.169  Even when no-fault divorce statutes required 
that courts consider the value of domestic labor, feminists argued that courts 
routinely undervalued those contributions.170  Laws on the equitable distribu-
tion of marital property, for instance, include factors that account for child-
care and unpaid work.171  However, the capacity of equitable distribution 
standards to compensate wives for their domestic labor has been a steady 
topic of debate, with many arguing that the costs of care work, as well as 
women’s inequality in the paid workforce, are perennially understated.172 
By the end of the 1980s, the cultural feminist critique of the no-fault 
regime permeated family law scholarship173; indeed, women’s disadvantage 
in divorce has been a subject of inquiry for the last thirty years.174  Today, for 
the most part, family law scholars do not question if women suffer more than 
men because of divorce.175  Lenore Weitzman’s empirical research on 
                                                          
 168.  CARBONE, supra note 144, at 22 (citing the work of Martha Fineman); see also Philomila 
Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 357, 387–90 (2007) (citing the scholarship of Joan Williams, Martha Fineman, and Katharine 
Silbaugh in work-care debates and noting reactions to that scholarship in the work of Vicki Schultz, 
Mary Anne Case, and Katherine Franke). 
 169.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2528.  Bennett Woodhouse has argued, “As femi-
nists have demanded new protections for women in the public sphere, we seem to have simultane-
ously acquiesced in a reductionist vision of moral responsibility in the domestic sphere.  Ironically, 
this is the sphere in which women are most at risk of economic, physical, and emotional injury.”  
Id.  
 170.  Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1260 (2015) (discussing 
feminist scholars critical of courts’ application of equitable distribution standards). 
 171.  Id. at 1258 (“[A]ll states have adopted either equitable distribution or community property 
principles, and state legislatures have entirely eliminated title-based systems.”). 
 172.  See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 937 (recounting the case of a wife who had 
been a full-time homemaker and, when her husband divorced her, “was left with almost nothing—
no employment history, no skills, no significant property settlement, no child support and no ali-
mony” (citing STARNES, supra note 147, at 2). 
 173.  CARBONE, supra note 144, at 21–22; see also Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
1325, 1338 (2013) (“Cultural feminism has become so well-known and prominent in feminist circles 
that some have called it the ‘official’ theory of the second wave.” (citing Robin West, Jurisprudence 
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1988); Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New 
Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 157, 162 (2010))). 
 174.  See Tsoukala, supra note 168, at 358. 
 175.  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 192 (noting that “even under the modern 
rules, women suffer more financially than men after divorce”); see also id. at 203 (citing the Weit-
zman study, which found that women’s standard of living declines disproportionately compared to 
men after divorce); HASDAY, supra note 137, at 116 (“Many studies have found that divorce is 
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women’s post-divorce quality of life is cited in almost every family law case-
book as proof that women have lower standards of living than men after di-
vorce.176  Subsequent studies have contradicted Weitzman’s conclusions, but 
many family law scholars have asserted that Weizman’s central claim still 
holds true.  Hasday, for example, described the problems with Weitzman’s 
study and then referred to research that rehabilitates Weitzman’s findings, 
concluding that “a wave of scholarship confirms the general trend that Weit-
zman highlighted.”177 
Yet, studies describing women’s post-divorce quality of life are twenty 
or more years old.178  Wendy Paris questions generalizations about women’s 
post-divorce lives and experience of divorce.179  She argues that studies about 
women’s post-divorce poverty are dated and based on participant populations 
that are not disaggregated for age, income, or location.180  As the next Part 
notes, race, class, and region heavily influence marriage and dissolution 
choices.181  This does not undermine the importance of gender in understand-
ing the costs of divorce; but it suggests that collapsing all wives into one 
category oversimplifies the financial outcomes of divorce for varying popu-
lations of women.182 
                                                          
economically disastrous for the average woman and her children . . . .”); Abrams, supra note 143, 
at 1014 (noting that child support guidelines were intended to ameliorate the post-divorce poverty 
of mothers: “Congress took an interest in child support guidelines, it argues, because divorce pushed 
women and children into welfare. . . .”); Bryan, supra note 24, at 1007–09, 1009 n.37 (restating 
feminist claims that divorce falls hardest on women and children); Singer, supra note 22, at 370 
n.37 (summarizing the perception that men win at traditional divorce and women lose). 
 176.  See generally LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).   
 177.  HASDAY, supra note 137, at 116–17.  Herma Hill Kay also examined feminists’ embrace 
of Weitzman and other studies of post-divorce poverty.  She noted that in response to studies of no-
fault divorce’s effects on women, including the Weitzman study, feminists found themselves in an 
odd alliance with family-values conservatives.  Hill Kay, Second Sex, supra note 120, at 2066–69. 
 178.  HASDAY, supra note 137, at 117 n.145.  Three studies cited by Hasday, for example, are 
from the early 1990s (1990, 1991, 1993) and one is from 2001. Id.  This most recent study, from 
2001, is based on data from the early 1990s.  Id.  Researchers Matthew McKeever and Nicholas 
Wolfinger relied on the 1992–1994 National Survey of Families and Households and argued that 
“marital disruption now has much more modest economic consequences for women than in years 
gone by.”  Matthew McKeever & Nicholas Wolfinger, Reexamining the Economic Costs of Marital 
Disruption for Women, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 202 (2001). 
 179.  PARIS, supra note 2, at 21–22.  
 180.  Id. at 2–3, 21 –22; see also Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Divorce American Style: Splitopia: 
Dispatches from Today’s Good Divorce and How to Part Well by Wendy Paris, 50 FAM. L.Q. 139, 
145 (2016) (book review) (noting Paris’s critique of Weitzman and her argument that “some people 
may become more productive after divorce, once they are free to concentrate on their careers”). 
 181.  See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES AND BLUE FAMILIES 
(2010). 
 182.  See Tsoukala, supra note 168, at 400 (“Women’s position in the family regularly gets con-
flated with their children’s, while the impoverishment precipitated by divorce is further identified 
with poverty tout court, with very little regard to actual differences in income levels.”). 
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In tandem with reactions to changes in custody and alimony laws, some 
feminists lamented the disappearance of spousal misconduct in divorce pro-
ceedings.  Part III demonstrates that research on the gendered effect of di-
vorce provides a justification for the quasi-therapeutic aspects of a collabo-
rative approach.  Feminists needed to look outside of courts and beyond state 
statutes if they were going to mitigate the burden that divorce imposed on 
wives and mothers.  So, although collaborative divorce may not be framed as 
a feminist project, it nonetheless accommodates certain feminist critiques.  
The next Part begins by examining how collaborative divorce is in conversa-
tion with scholarship that calls for the acknowledgement of marital wrongs 
in dissolution processes.  It concludes by considering how collaborative di-
vorce might advance or contradict other feminist-minded goals, such as anti-
stereotyping and strengthening women’s agency in bargaining. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF COLLABORATION 
Collaboration divorce’s incorporation of parties’ emotions, including 
their negative feelings, can support arguments for why spousal misbehavior 
during marriage should have consequences at divorce.  Noting the tendency 
to depict wives as the wronged spouses, this Part concludes by questioning 
how collaborative divorce might work for and against women. 
A.  A Forum for Fault 
Fault grounds and fault-based considerations, despite the uptake of no-
fault divorce, continue to exist.  Around one-third of states retain fault 
grounds alongside no-fault grounds, and about half of U.S. states permit 
courts to consider marital misconduct in awarding alimony (with only a few 
states permitting the same for property division).183  However, in half of the 
states, fault is not an explicit consideration in any part of the divorce pro-
cess.184  Even in states that consider misconduct, Joanna Grossman and Law-
rence Friedman note that judges do not often entertain fault or misconduct at 
divorce unless there is economic misconduct, such as intentional dissipation 
                                                          
 183.  In states that consider misconduct in divorce, most statutes incorporate considerations of 
misconduct in alimony awards and not in property division.  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 
119, at 207–09; Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 149, at 2536.  Three states continue to bar alimony 
to parties sued on fault grounds and fault is proven.  GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1(b) (2015); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-16.3A(a) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (2016). 
 184.  This approach is consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which 
rejected fault in setting out a model for states’ no-fault laws.  Describing the UMDA, Ertman states: 
“No-fault divorce is so businesslike that drafters of the new divorce laws renamed it ‘dissolution,’ 
a term borrowed from the law of business partnerships.”  ERTMAN, supra note 90, at 166. 
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of marital assets, or outrageous behavior, such as attempting to murder one’s 
spouse.185 
No-fault divorce was intended to relieve courts from the “moralistic 
judgments” of judging marital conduct.186  For example, in Mani v. Mani,187 
the New Jersey Superior Court explained why courts are hesitant to consider 
the during-marriage behavior of spouses in awarding alimony: “without con-
comitant benefit, considering non-economic fault can only result in ramping 
up the emotional content of matrimonial litigation and encouraging the par-
ties to continually replay the details of their failed relationship.”188  The opin-
ion concluded: “[W]e have . . . relieved matrimonial litigants and their coun-
sel from the need to act upon the nearly universal and practically irresistible 
urge for retribution that follows on the heels of a broken marriage.”189 
The resistance of courts to fault-based evidence has not changed.  But 
state laws need not require the establishment of fault grounds, like adultery, 
for misconduct to matter: non-court forums can include parties’ behavior dur-
ing marriage for any number of purposes.  This Section explores two pur-
poses—recognizing the inevitable role that emotions play and vindicating a 
wronged spouse.  The first justification sits at the intersection of law and 
psychology, and it draws heavily from scholarship on law and emotion as 
well as therapeutic jurisprudence.  The second justification depends on norms 
of justice and accountability.  These calls for including misconduct are not 
necessarily calls for out-of-court processes; feminist scholars, for instance, 
might advocate instead for substantive law reform. 
First, psychological studies of relationships suggest that even if no-fault 
laws do not assign responsibility for a breakup, many people assign blame or 
experience guilt because they feel loss at the end of a relationship.190  Thera-
peutic jurisprudence recognizes this reality and asks how the legal system 
might protect and not damage a person’s emotional health.  Clare Huntington 
studied therapeutic approaches in family law, and she explains that traditional 
dispute-resolution works against the “cycle of intimacy”: “[A] widely shared 
                                                          
 185.  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 208.  For example, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held “that marital fault is irrelevant to alimony except in two narrow instances:  cases in which 
the fault has affected the parties’ economic life and cases in which the fault so violates societal 
norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple 
justice.”  Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 906 (N.J. 2005).  
 186.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2536 (“Modern reformers tended to view alimony 
as a relic of an era of moralistic judgments . . . .”). 
 187.  869 A.2d 904 (N.J. 2005). 
 188.  Mani, 869 A.2d at 917. 
 189.  Id. at 918.   
 190.  HUNTINGTON, supra note 28, at 117 (arguing that “[a]lthough [guilt] has strong negative 
connotations, guilt can be a productive emotion, fueling the reparative drive” and that in certain 
cases not involving abuse, “it may be useful for all adult family members to consider how they 
contributed to the rupture”). 
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human experience is that individuals experience love, inevitably transgress 
against those they love, feel guilt about the transgression, and then seek to 
repair the damage.”191  Recognizing this “cycle of intimacy” has an instru-
mental purpose.  For parents of minor children, for instance, ignoring what 
happened in and at the end of a marital relationship can impede negotiating 
shared custody.192  An adversarial, court-managed no-fault divorce, however, 
“thwarts any instinct that people may have for reconciliation and compro-
mise.  It is no wonder that in these win-lose contexts, family members are 
frequently unable to move beyond whatever rupturing event led them to be-
come entangled in the legal system.”193 
This is not a call to reintroduce fault grounds; it is a call to reorder the 
legal process to recognize the discord caused by ending a relationship and to 
provide legal services that help heal rather than deepen relationship con-
flict.194  A collaborative divorce, in this way, seeks to improve the health and 
stability of parties’ post-divorce lives.  Particularly through the use of a di-
vorce coach, collaboration is a forum to assist parties in resolving anger and 
managing their emotions for their present and future well-being.  Its rela-
tional, tailored, client-centered approach seeks to accomplish those goals in 
ways a court cannot or will not.195  Such an approach should not only make 
the divorce process more responsive to (and arguably effective at) handling 
disputes, but collaborative materials also suggest that addressing blame and 
guilt at the end of relationship can be personally rewarding.196  Invoking col-
laborative rationales, Solangel Maldonado argues that forgiveness can con-
tribute to parties’ well-being after divorce because unresolved conflict or re-
sentment causes long-lasting physical and mental health problems.197  
                                                          
 191.  Id. at 86. 
 192.  Id. at 118.  Huntington argues that a better parenting relationship is one goal of a therapeu-
tic approach in family law disputes: “reparation means helping the ex-spouses understand that theirs 
will continue to be a joint enterprise, built on a shared love for children, rather than a shared love 
for each other.”  Id. at 119. 
 193.  Id. at 91. 
 194.  See also id. at 116.  Huntington explains:  
We should not return to the days when a divorce could be obtained only by showing that 
one party was at fault, but no-fault divorce can be more wishful thinking than reality” 
and proposing that “the new vision for dispute-resolution family law should be not a 
conflict-muting process but rather a process for first recognizing and only then resolving 
conflict.  
Id.  
 195.  MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 102–03 (demonstrating that courts are not skilled at 
“forward-looking” tasks of conflict resolution and improving communication styles of a couple). 
 196.  Freeman, supra note 25, at 221.  Marsha Freeman, for example, describes part of collabo-
rative divorce as including the recognition that “the mere act of contrition on the part of the offender 
can contribute to a feeling of validation on the part of the victim,” which restores one’s faith in the 
other party.  Id.  
 197.  Maldonado, supra note 90, at 451–52. 
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Dealing with anger means confronting previous conflict and often necessi-
tates an apology for harm caused, which can be something that, as Part I ex-
plained, divorce coaches urge parties to do.198  As a caveat, all conflicts need 
not end with peaceful resolution; the role of voicing emotions may not be 
eliminating conflict but channeling emotions for productive objectives. 
Second, introducing misconduct can give a wronged spouse a sense of 
justice.199  This justification for considering misconduct is often more con-
cerned with vindication.200  No-fault grounds hide the “salacious, shameful 
stories of adultery and abuse,” and this may minimize a spouse’s unjustified 
suffering or sense of betrayal.201  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse laments that 
at least the fault regime rewarded a “virtuous” spouse and in the no-fault era, 
“sex, lies, and dissipation—the beating, boozing, cheating, exploitation, and 
abuse that constituted ‘grounds’ for a traditional divorce—continue to pre-
sent serious risks to the dependent spouse.”202  Bennett Woodhouse compares 
marital deceit to rape: “Between spouses, lies are the dissipation of an intan-
gible asset, the abuse (indeed, the metaphorical rape) of an accumulated 
trust.”203  The problem then with no-fault laws is that guilty spouses are not 
punished for their abuse of marital trust and, without that punishment, there 
are few incentives for better behavior in marriage.204  Most relationships, of 
course, do not involve only good or bad actors.205  Depictions of “unilateral” 
breach of a marital contract do not account for the more likely scenario in 
which both parties have contributed to the end of the relationship or share 
some type of blame.206   
                                                          
 198.  Id. at 492–93, 498.  However, Maldonado suggests eliminating all marital misconduct from 
the formal, court-based divorce process, and promoting out of court alternatives as well as court-
ordered forgiveness education.  Id. at 448. 
 199.  Calls for inclusion of marital misconduct in contemporary divorce have taken a variety of 
forms and are not novel.  See, e.g., LINDA HIRSHMAN AND JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE 
POLITICS OF SEX 285 (1998) (proposing a cause of action for damages at divorce when a spouse 
committed adultery).  
 200.  Grillo writes: “Quite suddenly it became close to irrelevant whether one member of the 
couple had deceived, sexually or financially abused, or otherwise oppressed, the other.”  Grillo, 
supra note 21, at 1559. 
 201.  ERTMAN, supra note 90, at 166. 
 202.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2526. 
 203.  Id. at 2545. 
 204.  Id. at 2556. 
 205.  Compare Jill Hasday’s implication that there are two types of people in the world—deceiv-
ers and the deceived—and the question of deception is straight forward: “A lie is a lie . . . .”  JILL 
ELAINE HASDAY, INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW: GOVERNING DECEPTION IN OUR CLOSEST 
RELATIONSHIPS 8 (forthcoming) (excerpts on file with the author).  
 206.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules 
on Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315 (2008). 
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However, the perpetration of deception in marriage, at least in the liter-
ature that is dubious of no-fault, is typically gendered with gendered conse-
quences.  Bennett Woodhouse argued: 
A fault-blind approach to divorce—like a fault-blind approach to 
domestic violence—hurts women by suppressing more authentic 
narratives of their lives.  I will propose that, instead of ignoring 
marital misconduct, we consider reshaping the discourse of fault in 
marriage so that it provides affirmative protections for women.  As 
in workplace harassment and domestic violence, we must 
acknowledge fault if we are to provide protection and compensa-
tion for victims of abuse of spousal trust.207 
Some collaborative materials similarly presume that the cheated-on, lied-to, 
or mistreated spouse is typically the wife.208  Indeed, that women are the vic-
tims of marital fault seems to be taken as fact without the need for evidence.  
Bennett Woodhouse states: “I know of no empirical evidence on whether 
women are more ‘innocent’ than men, but I am persuaded by researchers who 
say they are on average less violent and more faithful (for whatever reason) 
than men.”209 
Narratives of women’s innocence and men’s wrongdoing might roughly 
approximate the victim/perpetrator themes of fault divorce, in which hus-
bands often were held responsible for the destruction of marriages.  Collab-
orative materials typically do not offer examples in which a wife has deceived 
a spouse or had an extramarital relationship.210  This is what fault grounds 
tended to do—simplify marital wrongs into a one-way harm and fit spouses 
into stereotyped roles of innocence and blameworthiness.211  But, these het-
eronormative paradigms are out of date and have always been limited; marital 
roles have evolved, understandings of gender are increasingly nuanced, and 
marriage now includes couples of the same sex. 
                                                          
 207.  Id. at 2529–30. 
 208.  SCHARFF & HERRICK, supra note 15, at 4, 74, 148. 
 209.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2556.  In a forthcoming book, Jill Hasday asserts 
that there is common presumption that women are more likely to be deceived than men, pointing to 
surveys of self-described behavior.  HASDAY, supra note 205, at 3–4 (citing surveys of college 
students asking if they have ever lied about sex and studies of participants’ misrepresentation on 
dating websites).  She argues that law should play a role in compensating those deceived.  Id. at 23.  
 210.  On gender roles, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 176–203 (2004) (com-
plicating the definitions of, and commitments to, sexuality, gender, and sexual difference).  See also 
Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Femi-
nist Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 520 (1988) (“In distinguishing sex from gender, feminist theorists 
have disputed causal explanations that assume that sex dictates or necessitates certain social mean-
ings for women’s experience.”). 
 211.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2557.  Bennett Woodhouse contemplates a similar 
criticism of her approach: “The danger, of course, is that allowing judges to consider fault, no matter 
how broadly defined, invites them to continue judging what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conduct according 
to their own fondly held stereotypes about ‘proper’ gender roles.”  Id.  
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Collaborative divorce materials, for example, rarely reference same-sex 
couples.212  With marriage equality, after Obergefell v. Hodges,213 this is an 
ever more conspicuous omission.214  Collaborative materials will evolve to 
accommodate this new population of potential clients, and this provides an 
opportunity to complicate depictions of martial relationships.  Presently di-
vorcing couples of the same sex have not arranged their lives with the back-
drop of no-fault rules or with the protection of states’ family laws.215  Without 
a doubt, the exclusion of LGBT persons from marriage was not only discrim-
inatory and stigmatizing, but also a significant obstacle to the realization of 
LGBT relationship rights.  Yet the exclusion also fostered varying means of 
ordering family life and establishing duties in a partnership.  Katherine 
Franke writes that “the diverse, nontraditional relationships and families . . . 
formed before [same-sex] marriage was a possibility will be shoe-horned into 
a one-size-fits-all kind of justice, slotting gay men and lesbians into the pre-
determined gender roles of marriage: husbands and wives.”216  This is an area 
in which collaborative divorce could pioneer new approaches by recognizing 
that any number of couples or families do not necessarily fit neatly into tra-
ditional husband-wife dyads. 
The adoption of collaborative divorce has distributive consequences, 
too.  Narratives of women’s vulnerability at the hands of bad-behaving men 
can both diminish and augment wives’ bargaining power in a privately or-
dered process.  Collaboration may privilege wives with wealth who—alt-
hough not at an economic disadvantage vis-à-vis their partners—can claim 
injury that understates their bargaining power.  At the same time, women at 
                                                          
 212.  An increasing number of collaborative materials and websites advertise services to couples 
of the same sex, however.  See, e.g., Angie Bain, Gay Divorce: How the Collaborative Family Law 
Model Can Help Parting LGBT Couples, HUFF. POST (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/angie-bain/gay-divorce-collaborative-family-law-model_b_1237969.html; Gay and 
Lesbian Community, N.Y. ASS’N OF COLLABORATIVE PROF’LS, http://www.nycollaborativeprofes-
sionals.org/who-is-collaborative-for/gay-and-lesbian-community/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016); 
GLBT Relationships, COLO. COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE PROF’LS, http://www.coloradocollabora-
tivedivorceprofessionals.com/GLBT.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
 213.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 214.  See Mayeri, supra note 136, at 131, 134 (noting that the Obergefell opinion may not chal-
lenge sex-specific roles in marriage: “Instead of propelling heterosexual couples toward more gen-
der egalitarian partnerships, marriage pushes same-sex couples to replicate gender specialization, 
alleviating pressure on the state and on employers to help families integrate breadwinning and care-
giving.”). 
 215.  Katherine Franke, Lesbian Husbands and Gay Wives: The Gendering of Gay Divorce, 
NATION (July 3, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/lesbian-husbands-and-gay-wives-gen-
dering-gay-divorce/ (“[S]ame-sex couples’ marrying raises the hard question of what it means to be 
‘weaker’ in a context where gender-based power is not creating an unequal playing field for the two 
parties’ negotiating rights and responsibilities in a marriage.”). 
 216.  Id.  Laura Rosenbury notes the ways in which family law scholarship assumes that care-
giving is the most important aspect of family life—more important than sexual or romantic attach-
ment.  Rosenbury, supra note 159, at 200–01. 
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a financial disadvantage, even when benefiting from therapeutic interven-
tions, may demand less from the other party in an effort to broker peace after 
divorce.  The next Section considers the role of misconduct in settlement ne-
gotiations in light of empirical research on gender differences in bargaining.  
It then assesses what women may win and lose within a therapeutically ori-
ented framework like collaborative divorce. 
B.  Stereotype and Settlement 
A foundation of collaborative divorce is that divorcing spouses should 
value relationship building and conflict reduction more than gaining a strate-
gic advantage over each other.217  This premise is evident in collaboration’s 
informal and voluntary discovery, the pledge to deal in good faith, and the 
intervention of mental health professionals.218  It is an approach that comports 
with the argument that marital misconduct, and the emotional consequences 
of it, matters to parties whether or not the legal system recognizes it as a 
ground for divorce or in alimony and property division.  To put it differently, 
how spouses communicate and negotiate, and the successful resolution of 
their marriage, depends in part on how their relationship ended. 
A number of studies have interrogated how fault, misconduct, blame, 
and forgiveness affect settlement negotiations.  In the early 1990s, for exam-
ple, Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin found that when spouses settle 
out of court, the “guilty” spouse often compensates the “innocent” spouse 
with a relatively generous settlement.219  More recently, Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan and Jonathan Baron conducted a study in which participants were asked 
to rate the fairness of a proposed agreement in twelve scenarios.220  In each 
scenario, a spouse had committed a “fault,” ranging from adultery to criminal 
activity.221  Although participants were asked to ignore spousal behavior, they 
nevertheless rated the proposals of “wrongdoers” lower than proposals of 
“victims.”222  The data supported the authors’ hypothesis that “the conflict 
                                                          
 217.  See Aviel, supra note 34, at 1118 n.116 (making the argument in the context of joint rep-
resentation); Tesler, supra note 28, at 326–28. 
 218.  See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 869, 887–88 (1994) (arguing that no-fault divorce incentivizes opportunistic behavior 
in marriage because there are no consequences for breach).   
 219.  ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN WITH CHARLENE E. DEPNER & H. 
ELIZABETH PETERS, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 123 
(1992).  Robert Emery and his colleagues interviewed divorcing couples and found that the hurt of 
being left by a spouse or the guilt of leaving a spouse shapes negotiations in divorce mediation.  
Emery et al., supra note 32, at 25, 30, 33. 
 220.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 206, at 320–25.  For limitations of the study, see id. 
at 336–37. 
 221.  Id. at 321–22.  For the first experiment, seventy-eight percent of the subjects were female, 
and the gender of wrongdoer switched from hypothetical to hypothetical.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 321, 323. 
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between the moral norm against marital misconduct and the legal rule of no-
fault property division may disrupt efficient bargaining.”223  Specifically, par-
ticipants rated wrongdoers’ settlement proposals as less reasonable than of-
fers with the same terms offered by the victims of spousal misconduct.224  At 
the study’s conclusion, “[s]ubjects expressed distress that, under the no-fault 
law, parties can breach a contract without repercussions.”225   
To make amends or to render justice in settlement negotiations can serve 
any number of interests.  A purported victim of a marital breach or miscon-
duct might ask for alimony, which a court might not award when applying 
the state’s statute, as proof of atonement or an apology.  Parties may be dis-
tracted by the desire for retribution and undervalue a reasonable offer.226  The 
desire to punish can be costly in divorce.227  Or a party may minimize a jus-
tifiable request for durational or permanent financial support for fear of caus-
ing conflict or because settlement conversations have focused on resolving 
past disputes.228  Collaborative divorce is relevant in these decisions because 
it too encourages parties to bargain for emotional stability or future peace.  
These are not necessarily bad deals; however, there is little analysis of how 
collaborative divorce caters to certain trades or how it shapes clients’ bar-
gaining priorities and perceptions. 
Indeed, research on gender and negotiation suspects that fault may often 
play an unproductive role in divorce settlements.  Empirical studies of ADR 
bargaining have long hypothesized that women are more likely than men to 
give up assets for the purpose of conflict avoidance.229  Beth Livingston, for 
example, describes the tactic of “relational accommodation,” in which parties 
adjust their self-interests to promote the interests of a relationship: 
In many situations, individuals view negotiation as a chance to en-
hance and strengthen relationships . . . and are concerned with how 
the negotiation might affect the long-term relationship . . . . The 
                                                          
 223.  Id. at 316. 
 224.  Id. at 334. 
 225.  Id. at 335. 
 226.  Beth A. Livingston, Bargaining Behind the Scenes: Spousal Negotiation, Labor, and 
Work-Family Burnout, 40 J. MGMT. 949, 954 (2014).  Livingston elaborates: “Couples do not al-
ways act as ‘rationally’ as the economic perspective of family bargaining would suggest; rather, 
they internalize gendered norms and re-create their family dynamics to meet these normative ex-
pectations.”  Id. 
 227.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 206, at 319.  Relying on psychological literature, 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron argue that divorce negotiations will trigger “people’s willingness to 
punish others, at a cost to themselves, for behavior perceived as unfair.”  Id. at 318.   
 228.  For a divorce regime that is dominated by private settlements with minimal court oversight, 
unilateral “breach” may result in greater number of impasses in negotiations.  Wilkinson-Ryan & 
Baron, supra note 206, at 316.  Jana Singer has noted that courts often rubberstamp the settlement 
agreements negotiated by divorcing couples with little oversight as to the agreements’ content.  
Singer, supra note 4, at 1475. 
 229.  See, e.g., Emery et al., supra note 32, at 29. 
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goal to increase relational capital (e.g., mutual liking, trust, etc.) 
and maintain the relationship may overwhelm the desire to obtain 
optimal economic outcomes.230 
Studies on settlement negotiations suggest that women are more likely 
to engage in relational accommodation.  Summarizing psychological and em-
pirical research, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and Deborah Small have written that 
women bargain based on the promise of apology or stability, and women tend 
to focus on maintaining good relationships rather than maximizing their self-
interest.231  The body of work that Wilkinson-Ryan and Small analyze indi-
cates that women undervalue their entitlements as well as underestimate their 
post-divorce material needs; they broker deals they perceive will preserve or 
heal a relationship, but sometimes to their detriment.232  The indeterminacy 
of divorce law also might work to women’s disadvantage because it sets few 
boundaries for negotiations, and, as Wilkinson-Ryan and Small argue, 
women are less likely than men to manipulate ambiguity for their gain.233  If 
women appear to care more than men about relationship preservation, it is 
because they suffer penalties (such as explicit and implicit discrimination) 
when they “negotiate aggressively or behave in a self-interested manner.”234 
To the extent gender influences bargaining, out-of-court processes that 
privilege relational accommodation should benefit women.  That is, collabo-
ration’s concern with conflict resolution and relationship building should 
help parties who seek to preserve a relationship and work against parties 
looking to gain a strategic advantage.235  As Amy Cohen demonstrates, taking 
                                                          
 230.  Livingston, supra note 226, at 953 (citations omitted) (first citing Michele J. Gelfland et 
al., Negotiating Relationally: The Dynamics of the Relational Self in Negotiations, 31 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 427 (2006); then citing Leonard Greenhalgh & Roderick W. Gilkey, The Effect of 
Relationship Orientation on Negotiators’ Cognitions and Tactics, 2 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 
103 (1993); and then citing Kathleen L. Valley et al., Friends, Lovers, Colleagues, Strangers: The 
Effects of Relationships on the Process and Outcome of Dyadic Negotiations, in RESEARCH ON 
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS 65 (Robert J. Bies et al. eds., 1995)). 
 231.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral 
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 115–16 (2008).  For example, Wilkinson-
Ryan and Small state that research suggests that women prefer face-to-face, private (rather than 
judge-directed) settlements that preserve relationships.  Id. at 111. 
 232.  Id. at 116, 126, 127; Livingston, supra note 226, at 526.  See also generally Cohen, supra 
note 20, at 180–88 (describing and contemplating studies on the gendered implications of negotia-
tion). 
 233.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 231, at 123. 
 234.  Id. at 118. 
 235.  Cohen writes:  
[G]lorification of feminine values has met with several persistent critiques: (1) it essen-
tializes and reinforces stereotypes that have traditionally disempowered women, with lit-
tle regard to class, race, or situational power; (2) it extols and idealizes qualities arising 
from women’s subordination and thus serves to further entrench their oppression; (3) it 
ignores or even contradicts “empirical” evidence to the contrary; and (4) it maintains a 
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relational concerns seriously responds to the feminist critique of ADR mech-
anisms, which did not appear to incorporate what women valued in negotia-
tions.236  Collaboration takes up that challenge and justifies why non-finan-
cial or emotional factors should shape parties’ conversations about settlement 
offers.237   
The question for collaborating teams to decide is how much attention 
financial considerations should take, especially if they impede building trust 
for a post-divorce relationship.238  One might imagine negotiations in which 
a spouse’s monetary contribution to marital assets becomes less important 
than it would under a state’s equitable division statute.239  Relational accom-
modation in exchange for a lower financial settlement, for example, might 
help improve post-divorce communication, and, in the long term, each 
party’s quality of life.  But, there may be a “harsh reality” after settlement 
when relationships do not bear fruit and one spouse gave up property or assets 
in exchange for the promise of future goodwill.240  Many couples who relied 
on mediation in their divorce process report that they remain unhappy with 
                                                          
structural system of (heterosexual) masculine and feminine identity that ultimately per-
petuates rather than subverts the status quo. 
Cohen, supra note 20, at 171 (footnotes omitted) (citing Naomi R. Cahn, Theoretics of Practice: 
The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action: Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 
1050–54 (1992); then citing Rachel T. Hare-Mustin & Jeanne Marecek, Gender and the Meaning 
of Difference: Postmodernism and Psychology, in MAKING A DIFFERENCE: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER 22, 52 (Rachel T. Hare-Mustin & Jeanne Marecek eds., 1990); and 
then citing Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 90–91 (1994)).  
 236.  Amy Cohen describes “a full-blown feminist assault” on ADR: “If anything, feminists pre-
dicted that under structural conditions of ‘private’ inequality, women, overly endowed with rela-
tional and affective traits, would be even further exploited by a regime of voluntary negotiated ex-
change.”  Cohen, supra note 16, at 118–19.  For example, collaborative divorce may respond to the 
criticism that mediation and negotiation do not bring in “the woman-identified values of intimacy, 
nurturance, and care into a legal system” but rather “deliver something coercive in its place.”  Grillo, 
supra note 21, at 1603.   
237. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 206, at 323.  Studies demonstrate, however, that 
there is no extensive proof that mothers trade economic support for custody and that mothers had 
better outcomes in both adversarial and non-adversarial processes than fathers.  MACCOBY & 
MNOOKIN, supra note 219, at 156; Emery et al., supra note 32, at 29. 
 238.   See, e.g., Zoe Blomfield, Keeping the Family Together: The Collaborative Approach to 
Family Law, VIBERTS, https://www.viberts.com/articles/keeping-the-family-together-the-collabo-
rative-approach-to-family-law/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (“Pauline Tesler . . . said of the process 
‘I say to them: if you would rather give up the right to dance at your daughter’s wedding for another 
$20,000 on the settlement, then there are lawyers down the street who would love to help you and 
you’ll send their child to university—not yours.’”). 
 239.  Since the 1960s, economists have applied economic theories to family law issues.  Singer, 
supra note 4, at 1523 (citing scholars such as Gary Becker).  There are differences in how feminists 
articulate those benefits and how, for example, a contract scholar or economist would.  See Ann 
Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9, 14, 
25 (1996) (demonstrating that contract principles increasingly influence family law and that private 
agreements can be wealth maximizing).  
 240.  Bryan, supra note 24, at 1016. 
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their settlements.241  And, as noted, it is not clear how many formerly-collab-
orating spouses return to court to renegotiate their financial and custody ar-
rangements. 
Collaborative divorce’s reputational approach also potentially mini-
mizes women’s bargaining power, particularly for women with resources at 
their disposal.242  The studies cited in this Section—as well as the scholarship 
on women’s post-divorce poverty—begin with the premise that women are 
disadvantaged in negotiations, either because of financial inequities or be-
cause of spousal bullying.  Taking the latter, some scholars contend that 
wives are psychologically and economically vulnerable by virtue of the ine-
qualities that characterize all, or almost all, marriages.243  These arguments 
underpin feminist assertions that marriage, to oversimplify, is an institution 
designed to subordinate women.244  The paradigmatic example of women’s 
lack of agency in family life or in marital relationships is domestic or intimate 
partner violence.245  Some feminist scholars, however, note that certain forms 
                                                          
 241.  Maldonado, supra note 90, at 473.  One estimate is that up to twenty-five percent of couples 
remain in high conflict after settlement or trial.  Id. at 453 n.50.   
 242.  Bryan, supra note 24, at 1008–10 (presuming that fathers earn higher incomes and have 
higher educational levels than mothers, who, according to Bryan, are more likely to live in poverty 
after divorce). 
 243.  Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 147, at 2552 (“Feminists might blame marriage, the wage 
structure, and other economic and cultural factors that encourage female dependency, but, never-
theless, no-fault ideology exacerbates a very real vulnerability.”); see also Bryan, supra note 24, at 
1003 n.7 (explaining the power disparities between wives and husbands because of “masculine sub-
stantive law” and wives’ financial dependency, “naïve trust of [their] husband,” socialization, 
“greater likelihood of depression and low self-esteem,” and lower expectations).  But see Aviel, 
supra note 34, at 1141 (“A wife whose nonfinancial contributions to the marriage render her eco-
nomically vulnerable cannot plausibly share an attorney with a husband who views his earning ca-
pacity as the result of individual effort . . . .”). 
 244.  See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (“Alt-
hough its positive attributes were acknowledged, marriage also was understood to include gendered 
obligations and responsibilities that deprived spouses of certain liberties and channeled them into a 
disciplined way of life.”); see also Rosenbury, supra note 159, at 193 (describing marriage as a 
vehicle that supported women’s and children’s dependency). 
 245.  See generally KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM 
APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE xiii (2008); LEIGH 
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2012); 
JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 4 (2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
741, 789 (2007). 
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of legal protection, particularly when offered through criminal law enforce-
ment,246 presuppose what women should value when ending an abusive rela-
tionship—safety over financial independence, for instance.247  This raises the 
question of what types of conflict resolution a collaborative process should 
include, which is an issue relevant to vetting clients for abusive histories, 
discussed in Part I.  Excluding from collaborative divorce those who may 
have been subjected to intimate partner violence excludes some women who 
might want what collaboration has to offer, such as resolving conflict or a 
continuing relationship with their former spouse.248  Parties that are ready to 
move on from the relationship and to seek closure may not need collabora-
tion, much less a team of professionals.  Collaboration might be more useful 
to couples in various forms of conflict, subject to the particularities of the 
relationships and the couples’ history. 
Addressing women’s financial disadvantage, June Carbone and Naomi 
Cahn paint a picture of marriage that complicates assumptions about 
women’s vulnerability and weaker bargaining position.  They note that be-
tween fifty-eight and seventy-five percent of married women are in the work-
force, and now women who chose to marry are typically older, educated at 
the college level and beyond, with moderate to high incomes.249  Carbone and 
Cahn demonstrate that marriage for this subset of women looks egalitarian, 
with partners sharing gains and losses over the course of a relationship and 
at the relationship’s end.250 
Coupled with this demographic information is the fact that collaborative 
divorce is available only to those with the resources to afford it.  Parties (or 
at least one party) to a collaborative divorce must be able to pay the fees of 
two lawyers and a team of experts.  This is an increasingly privileged group 
                                                          
 246.  See Gruber, supra note 173, at 1349.  Gruber noted:  
Because [of grand narratives of women’s subordination,] the theories seek to describe an 
overarching inequality between men and women, they have a tendency to reject or ignore 
nuance and multiple axes of subordination and instead adhere to reductionist notions of 
good and bad . . . .  In the dominance feminist mindset, bad is men dominating women 
through sex, and good is the eradication of such domination. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, in 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 263, 272 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)). 
 247.  GOODMARK, supra note 245, at 5–6. 
 248.  Id. (noting that essentializing women’s experience of violence can ignore or undermine 
women who are survivors of intimate violence but want to maintain a relationship with a partner). 
 249.  See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 41, 99 (2014). 
 250.  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 946.  Cahn and Carbone found that marriage is less 
attractive to people without some amount of professional advancement and disposable income, and 
giving up work for childcare now corresponds to an increasingly elite set of couples in which one 
is a middle- to upper-income earner that can support the other spouse’s reallocation of time to do-
mestic duties or temporary exit from a profession.  Id. at 939 n.100, 947–48. 
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of people.  Generally, dispute resolution systems that are dependent on law-
yers create a two-track system—one for families with resources and one for 
families without resources.251  Nationally, only twenty percent of couples 
have two lawyers, and fifty percent have no lawyer at all.252  Half of divorce 
cases in some states are pro se, and there has been a rise of self-directed di-
vorce with the aid of paid and unpaid website tools.253  Like marriage, the 
professional services of lawyers, therapists and accountants are accessible 
based on class and income.254  So while wealthier people are overrepresented 
in the married population, low income married couples do not have the means 
to afford comparable professional services.255 
Most parties that enter a collaborative process, as currently constructed, 
will not be economically vulnerable or at a substantial financial disadvantage 
to their partners.  Some will benefit from the voluntary discovery of financial 
assets and an assessment by a shared financial neutral.  Although collabora-
tion threatens to expel any party who negotiates in bad faith or fails to dis-
close material information, the informal nature of the process could nonethe-
less result in incomplete disclosure or undetected abuse, especially when 
compared to discovery governed by statute and required by courts.  Yet, col-
laborative divorce, drawing from literature discussed in this Section, might 
assume that women start at a bargaining disadvantage.  And the introduction 
of gendered marital misconduct could inadvertently sustain stereotypes about 
women’s agency, minimizing how wives might trade on their assumed vul-
nerability. 
The point is not to advocate against alimony or an augmented share of 
marital money for women with wealth, and it is not to argue that those acting 
with strategic advantage should be shamed.  This Article’s argument is not 
normative; there may be good reasons to engage in relational accommodation 
with pay offs that one or both parties deeply value.  The point is that parties’ 
advantages in settlement negotiations may be difficult to assess within a ther-
apeutic process.  Gendered stereotypes and stock explanations of why mar-
riages fail may defeat the contextual and client-centered goals of collabora-
tion, offering an impoverished account of how power has been distributed in 
                                                          
 251.  MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 56, 130–32; see also infra note 77 (describing the 
burdens of divorce on low-income parties). 
 252.  Aviel, supra note 34, at 1109–11; see also MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 69 (noting 
that most divorcing couples cannot afford two lawyers or even one lawyer).  
 253.  Lande, supra note 31, at 418–20. 
 254.  Abrams, supra note 143, at 1004 n.9, 1020.  Far fewer couples are getting married today; 
at present, fifty percent of the population is married.  Id.  Marriage rates have declined, particularly 
for low-income populations in the United States.  See generally Carbone & Cahn, supra note 249, 
at 40–41.  
 255.  MURPHY & SINGER, supra note 4, at 56, 130–32; see also supra note 77 (describing the 
burdens of divorce on low-income parties). 
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a couple’s relationship.256  Over time and in terms not defined by a divorce 
process, collaboration may equip parties to move forward with their post-
divorce lives.  But it may not.  There may be little incentive to deal with an 
ex-spouse in the language of relationship building and doing so may cause, 
rather than prevent, conflict. 
Thus, a final underexplored consequence of collaboration is that it may 
deepen the characterization of the family as the site for healing and altruism 
and undermine the family as a site of distribution and of contract.257  
Philomila Tsoukala notices the resistance to contractual values in family law, 
arguing “many feminist thinkers repeatedly returned to the idea that some-
thing about economic rationality makes it particularly inept at capturing the 
realities of family life, and some even suggested there is something inappro-
priate about the use of economics to describe family life or women’s la-
bor.”258  Likewise, descriptions of collaborative divorce do not include con-
tractual explanations for parties’ bargaining power, because how parties bear 
the risks of their exchanges is in the language of emotional stability and self-
improvement.259  Yet, the therapeutic aspects of collaborative divorce could 
be described in contract terms—a third-party auditor to assess the infor-
mation and credibility of parties (a divorce coach) or exchanging risk in the 
face of uncertainty based on broad or self-enforcing terms (such as conflict 
                                                          
 256.   See Cohen, supra note 16, at 126 (“The challenge for contemporary ADR critics and pro-
ponents, then, is as it always was: attention to distribution and power.”).   
 257.   Halley, supra note 142, at 288, 291; see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: 
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1983); cf. Martha M. Ertman, 
Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 
(2001) (“The status hierarchies in business models, however, are fundamentally different from those 
in the natural model.  Status differences in family law reflect and perpetuate inequality, grounding 
that inequality in purportedly natural differences.  Business analogies, in contrast, substitute func-
tionalist reasoning for moral judgment.”). 
 258.  Tsoukala, supra note 168, at 361.  Tsoukala concludes:  
[M]any of the feminist objections to the adequacy or desirability of economics as a tool 
for capturing family life can be traced to feminist impulses that tend to entrench the 
male/female dichotomy in a number of ways.  The goal is to highlight the insights that 
feminists can gain from developments in economic thought and reclaim the assumption 
of selfishness as a core part of “methodological individualism” and a useful and appro-
priate tool for feminists. 
Id. at 362 (footnote omitted). 
 259.  The early and well known work of Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser details the stra-
tegic behavior of negotiating spouses—to promise, to threaten, to bluff and to assess and value risk 
and transactional costs in agreeing to settlement terms.  Compare Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra 
note 154, at 972, with Ertman, supra note 257, at 90 (“Business models offer an attractive alternative 
to naturalized constructions of intimate relations for at least two reasons.  First, market rhetoric is 
rarely naturalized.  Second, contracts do not require public or majoritarian approval to be enforced, 
and could, therefore, disrupt the hierarchical structure that naturalized understandings impose upon 
marginalized groups.”). 
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resolution).260  An out-of-court process for divorce might be the place for 
compromise and selflessness.  But it is also the space for bargaining in one’s 
self interest.  That, too, is a feminist project worth advancing.261 
CONCLUSION 
Collaborative divorce incorporates marital misconduct into the dissolu-
tion process by guiding couples to express their emotions and to seek or to 
give forgiveness, and this works around the declining relevance of spousal 
behavior in the era of no-fault divorce.  Indeed, collaborative divorce can 
help reduce gendered differences in bargaining and resist gender stereo-
types—mental health professionals, for example, might as naturally encour-
age equality between ex-spouses as they might emphasize the vulnerability 
of one spouse at the hands of the other.  Moreover, considering spousal mis-
conduct as a part of the divorce process might help some parties resolve their 
conflicts and move forward in healthy post-divorce lives.  But also worth 
considering are situations in which collaborative techniques exacerbate 
power differentials between spouses or entrench problematic stereotypes.  
This Article is an attempt to map some of the unintended consequences 
of collaborative models without purporting to know the frequency with which 
those consequences occur.  Future research could engage questions of how 
collaborative divorce is actually practiced.262  Do ex-spouses resort to court 
after they reach a collaborative settlement?  How do lawyers manage clients 
that fail to disclose material information?  Is there a means to measure if 
collaboration is succeeding?  What is the gap between how collaborative ma-
terials describe client communication and how professionals conduct client 
meetings?  These are important questions this Article does not address, the 
answers to which certainly would shape its analysis and influence its conclu-
sions.  Rather, the purpose of this Article is to support collaborative divorce’s 
                                                          
 260.  Cf. Michael Klausner, Deals: The Economic Structure of Business Transactions (Mar. 5, 
2014) (unpublished book proposal) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author) (proposing to provide a 
vocabulary of contract terms generalizable to most commercial or business deals that respond to 
economic challenges). 
 261.  See, e.g., Tsoukala, supra note 168, at 410 (arguing for feminists to view women as “ra-
tional profit-maximizers” with “their own moves to play, giving up one thing to gain another” and 
acting with “agency even within the confines of institutional, societal, and personal constraints”). 
 262.  For example, a future research project might examine how lawyers and their clients actu-
ally employ the work of mental health experts (and other professionals) in the collaborative process, 
and frame that work in the larger context of the privatization of legal services.  As noted, there is a 
lack of research exploring the gap between what collaborative materials say and what collaborative 
professionals do.   
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capacity to upend the taken-for-granted scripts of marital wrongs and to in-
corporate a more complicated vision of divorcing women’s agency as well as 
a more nuanced understanding of gender.263 
                                                          
 263.  See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 159, at 217 (arguing that the legal recognition of friend-
ship, as well as a challenge to coupling as the lynchpin of intimacy, could “enhance the ability of 
women to experience more robust notions of agency and equality in everyday life”). 
